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Abstract
In this thesis I apply the tools of information economics to analyse the way 
that information is transmitted in the stock market and the firm. In particular, I use 
models o f asymmetric information to explain a number of empirical regularities that 
affect the modem corporation and the modem capital market.
In the first chapter I show that delegation o f decision-making rights can stim­
ulate the career concems of subordinates in organisations. I show that, when an 
employer takes a decision following the proposal o f her subordinate, a winner’s 
curse reduces the subordinate’s prospects in the labour market, muting incentives. 
This can be solved by delegating decision-making rights to the worker.
The second chapter is a joint work with Marc Moller. We use tools o f in­
formation economics to propose a model of leadership in order to understand why 
many leaders are unduly confident in their own judgment, a fact that frequently af­
flicts modem organisations. We show that overconfidence can improve a leader’s 
use of private information although it harms the aggregation o f extemal advice. 
Overconfidence can therefore improve overall efficiency if  the cost o f consulting 
extemally is sufficiently high.
In the last chapter I apply similar tools to study how investors in the stock 
market react to public messages that may be optimistically biased. I first constmct 
a communication game between an investor and a (possibly) biased securities an­
alyst. I find an equilibrium characterized by the following properties: first, the
Abstract
investor reacts more to bad news than to good news, and second, the difference in 
this reaction is higher when the investor has a greater prior suspicion that the an­
alyst is a biased type. I then use parametric and nonparametric techniques and a 
large database o f earnings and forecasts to test these predictions, and find that the 
evidence supports them.
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Introduction
The rapid progress o f information economics has offered academics a valuable frame­
work to analyse the way that information is transmitted in human organisations. In this 
thesis, I apply tools developed in the last two decades to advance the study o f two o f these 
organisations: the modem company and the capital market.
I start by analysing the way that information is accumulated and used in hi­
erarchical organisations. In my first chapter, I offer a new argument why delegation of 
decision-making rights may be beneficial to the eflhciency o f an organisation. In particular, 
I suggest that such delegation may stimulate the career concems o f subordinates. I show 
this by building a theoretical model where an employer/superior and a subordinate have to 
seek information and take a decision about the strategic direction for the company. I show 
that, when the employer retains authority over the decision and takes the decision following 
the proposal o f her subordinate, she has better information about the performance (ability) 
of the worker than is available to the labour market. When this happens, the labour mar­
ket wage offers to the subordinate are likely to suffer from “the winner's curse”, so rewards 
for good performance are reduced. With such muted incentives the subordinate has no in­
terest in seeking information. I conclude this chapter by showing how this problem can be 
solved by delegating decision-making rights to the worker.
The second chapter o f my thesis is joint work with Marc Moller. We study a 
hierarchical scenario where the main function o f the leader is to gather information and 
to take decisions. An important ingredient o f our model is that often the leader worries
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about the impact on his subordinate’s motivation of his decisions. We show that ineffi­
ciency arises when the leader’s private information does not point in the direction that is 
most effective for motivational purposes. Since the leader does not fully internalise the cost 
of the effort incurred by his subordinate, he is willing to adopt a suboptimal decision that 
induces higher motivation in her. In this context we compare alternative leadership styles, 
using the confidence of the leader in his ability to make good decisions as a differentiating 
variable. “Overconfident” leaders overestimate such ability and we show that they gather 
too little extemal information, as compared to “realistic” leaders. Overconfident leaders 
are, however, less willing to distort their decisions to boost their subordinates’ motivation, 
which makes their decision-making more efficient. We show that appointing an overconfi­
dent leader may improve overall efficiency when the cost o f gathering extemal information 
is high and his private information is very precise.
In the last chapter I apply the tools of information economics to the study of 
the transmission o f information in the stock market. In particular, I study how investors 
react to public messages that may be optimistically biased. I first construct a communica­
tion game between an investor and a (possibly) biased securities analyst. My model is in 
the tradition o f the strategic information transmission literature, and I find an equilibrium 
characterized by the following properties: first, the investor reacts more to bad news than 
to good news, and second, the difference in this reaction is higher when the investor has a 
greater prior suspicion that the analyst is a biased type. I then use parametric and nonpara­
metric techniques and a large database of eamings and forecasts to test these predictions, 
and find that the evidence supports them. Lastly, I also provide some evidence in favour of
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the claim that analysts bias their forecasts in order to avoid losing access to the company 
management and the information deriving from it.
Chapter 1 
Authority, Delegation and the Winner’s Curse
“Mr. Bloomblerg seems happier than his predecessor to let officials run their de­
partments and take credit where it is due, without micro-managing their every decision" 
[13]
1.1 Introduction
Every good manager understands that it is impossible to give responsibility without giv­
ing power. In recent years, numerous organisations have engaged in a process of formal 
empowerement o f their subordinates, allowing them the right to take decisions without in­
terferences from upper management. According to a survey by Osterman [10] around 45% 
of workers have large discretion over the mode of doing their job. Similarly, casual observa­
tion often points towards decentralisation o f decision-making powers and responsibilities, 
with flatter hierarchies and greater autonomy of teams. Rajan and Zingales [11] assert, per­
haps excessively, that "the biggest challenges for the owners or top management today is 
to manage in an atmosphere of diminished authority".
Economic theory has started in the last years to address the fact that authority within 
organisations matters. Following Aghion and Tirole [1], the main emphasis has been on 
the congruence o f objectives between a firm and its employees. They stress that as interests 
become more aligned, delegation of power motivates employees without causing severe 
disruption o f the decision-making process.
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This chapter follows a somewhat different path, based on the observation that an im­
portant part o f the incentives in agency relationships are career-concems based. As the 
above quote suggests, the chapter’s aim is to highlight the fact that delegation often im­
proves the allocation of responsibility by allowing employees to take credit for the deci­
sions they have had an influence on. The reason for this is two-fold. First o f all, delegation 
makes the performance o f a worker more transparent to third parties, by removing the 
possible noise of a superior reversing the worker’s decisions. Secondly, it also makes infor­
mation about performance more symmetric, since the superior becomes an observer of the 
decision’s result, rather than a participant o f the decision process. Consequently she has as 
much information as outside parties.
The second reason forms the central of the analysis in this chapter. I show how 
when the current employer of a worker holds better information about his performance (and 
therefore his ability) than prospective future employers, a winner’s curse effect appears 
in the labour market. To elaborate, following an outside offer to the worker, the current 
employer will decide to match it only when the worker is o f relatively high ability. Outside 
employers, being often left with the worst o f the pick, will react by reducing offers to all 
workers, regardless o f their observed performance. The low responsiveness o f future wages 
to performance -that is, the weakness of the career concems incentives- will reduce the 
information acquisition effort of the worker. It follows therefore from the analysis that the 
interplay between career concems and the winner’s curse effect creates a trade-off between 
increasing the incentives of the worker ex ante and extracting a rent from him ex post. By 
delegating (i.e. disappearing from the decision process) a principal is committing to not
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know more than third parties about the performance o f a worker. That is costly ex post 
since it decreases the quality of the decisions, and it also denies the possibility o f keeping 
an able worker at depressed wages. The advantage, however, stems from the improved ex 
ante incentives that the worker has to appear as able.
Model and Results. The interaction between these different forces is studied in an or­
ganisation consisting of an employer (she) and a worker o f uncertain ability (he) engaged 
in a principal-agent relationship with moral hazard in information acquisition. A decision 
must be taken with respect to the choice between two alternative projects that, if  successful, 
deliver private benefits to the employer. A distinct feature o f the model is that the knowl­
edge o f the two agents is complementary in a particular way. The worker is informed about 
the technical side of the choice, that is, the prospects o f success o f the two projects. The 
employer, on the other hand, observes the private value that she attaches to the success of 
the different projects. To simplify, it is assumed that both o f them remain completely un­
informed about the other side’s knowledge. This specific information structure is proposed 
to stress the possibility o f intervention ex post, where, if  she retains the right to do so, the 
employer may decide to reverse the proposal o f the worker after observing that the project 
with less chances of success is nevertheless worth undertaking. I believe that this kind of 
intervention is very common in reality. Think, for instance, o f a football club. Technically 
the coach o f the team is obviously better informed about what players should be hired for 
the following season. On the other hand, the president o f the club may not resist interven­
ing in the hiring process in order to, for instance, sign a popular scorer who does not fit into 
the coach’s scheme. The marketing benefits o f doing so may outweigh the risk o f jeop­
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ardising the chances of winning the league in the following season. Similarly, a mutual 
fund manager may be obliged to invest in a certain underperforming company in which his 
superior holds a personal stake. Another example is the fact that securities analysts work­
ing for investment banks have often found themselves pressured to recommend companies 
to investors in order to win more investment banking business for their employers. It is 
worth stressing that the employers in the three examples above do not hold better informa­
tion than their employees about the technical side o f the choice. However, they still find it 
worth reversing their employees proposals.
The accuracy o f the proposal by the worker depends both on his ability and on his 
information acquisition. This acquisition is private and costly, which introduces a moral 
hazard problem. I adopt an incomplete contracts approach by assuming than neither the 
choice o f project nor the private value to the employer can be contracted upon. However, 
incentives for information acquisition can still be provided through career concems. There 
are two reasons for that. On the one hand, more able employees make more accurate 
proposals. On the other hand, outside prospective employers observe the success or failure 
of the decision, and adjust their expectation about the ability o f the worker accordingly. 
Those reputation incentives are rather obvious in the examples above, but incentives in 
many other professions are, to some extent, career concems based.
An unfortunate fact that weakens the strength o f the career concems is that, if the em­
ployer keeps ultimate authority, outside firms can only observe the success or failure of the 
project choice, and not whether the decision followed the worker’s proposal or was reversed 
by the employer. I believe that this is quite realistic, capturing the fact that two members of
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an organisation working closely together can establish a communication channel without 
the knowledge o f third parties. An immediate effect of tke inability by the outside market 
to spot when the superior reverses the worker’s proposal, is that the result o f the decision 
becomes a worse estimate o f the ability of the worker. The reason is that following the ob­
servation o f a successful project, the outside market will be unsure as to whom they should 
allocate the credit for the decision. More importantly, I show below how it also creates 
a winner’s curse. Because the current employer is able to allocate the credit better, she 
will seek to retain a worker when the credit is due to him, failing to match outside offers 
when he is o f relative low ability. Being left with the worse workers, the optimal response 
of outside employers will be to reduce their wage offers to any worker, independently of 
their observed quality. The market’s response is ex post beneficial for the employer, since 
this way she will usually manage to retain good workers at low wages, therefore extract­
ing rents from them. The down side is the incentives o f the worker. The decrease in the 
responsiveness o f future wages to the accuracy o f the proposals o f the worker will have a 
demotivating effect, leading to lower information acquisition.
When the employer commits not to interfere in the decision-making process, the in­
formation about the worker’s performance becomes more transparent and more symmetric. 
Consequently, the incentives for the worker to signal high ability -by acquiring informa­
tion about the best project- and be rewarded for it -in the form of future wages- become 
stronger. The employer gains ex ante from a better informed worker, but fails to be able 
to block projects that are obviously not in his interest. Furthermore, the employer ceases
1.2 Related work 15
to hold superior information about the ability o f the worker, and therefore cannot extract a 
rent on him.
Outline. This chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.2 contains a discussion of 
related literature. Section 1.3 describes the assumptions of die model and comments on the 
alternative decision rights arrangements. Section 1.4 shows why career concems incentives 
are stronger under delegation than under authority and studies under what circumstances 
delegation is more efficient. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Related work
The most direct link o f this chapter is to the delegation literature started by Aghion and Ti­
role [1]. They argue that workers are more motivated to become informed and learn about 
different projects when they get to decide. If the interests of firm and worker are sufficiently 
congruent, the firm may benefit from this increase in effort when it delegates authority over 
a decision. Carbonara [3] extends their basic model by showing that delegation is optimal 
when parties’ interests are neither too divergent nor too close. Alternatively, Baker, Gib­
bons and Murphy [2] claim that decision rights can be delegated through self-enforcing 
incentive contracts. While this chapter shares, with the above papers, the view that deci­
sion making rights shape the acquisition o f information by the worker, the focus is on the 
effect that such rights have on the career concems incentives of the worker. In this respect 
this chapter endogenises the congmence of interests by underlining the potential conflict 
between the technical success o f a project and the value the principal appropriates from it.
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The career concems literature was started by Fama [6] and Holmstrom [8]. They 
show how, in the absence of contracts, the market will provide implicit, though insufficient, 
incentives for an agent o f uncertain ability. The impact o f different information structures 
on incentives is analysed by Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole [5], who study a generalised 
version o f Holmstrom’s model. All o f them take the information structure as given, without 
focusing on the impact o f the organisation design. Ortega [9] is probably the most closely 
related to the present chapter. Like me, he studies the effect o f the redistributing power 
on the visibility -the career concems incentives- o f the workers. However, he concentrates 
on the distribution of power among agents, and assumes that information about worker’s 
performance is always symmetric. This chapter, however, involves a principal and an agent 
and focuses on the implications of asymmetric information and the role of the winner’s 
curse.
Lastly, two papers whose focus is also close are Greenwald [7] and Cremer [4]. 
Greenwald is the first study on the winner’s curse in the labour market. He shows how 
the existence of asymmetric information damages a worker’s freedom to change jobs, as 
well as reducing his wage below his productivity level. While I use some o f his intuitions, I 
show how the employer may gain by altering the information structure, therefore reducing 
the effect o f the winner’s curse. Cremer shows that a principal can gain by committing not 
to leam the ability of an under-performing agent, since it makes it more difficult to threaten 
him by terminating his contract. This chapter also praises the virtues o f strategic ignorance, 
although it emphasises different issues.
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1.3 The model
Consider a world consisting of a risk neutral agent (the worker) hired for a single period by 
a risk neutral principal (the employer). A large number o f potential future employers of the 
worker have production technologies identical to his current employer and are hereinafter 
referred to as the market.
Production Technology. Employer and worker have to choose between two projects, 
0 and 1, which are mutually exclusive (i.e., only one of the two projects can be adopted). 
The projects’ success depend upon the state o f the world, x G {0 ,1}, so that project 0 is 
successful if  and only if it is adopted when a: =  0 and similarly for project 1. The state 
of the world is unknown ex ante, but it is common knowledge that both states are equally 
likely to occur.
The projects’ payoffs are received by the employer, and are conditional upon success 
in the following manner: a successful project pays either B  or 0; a failed project always 
brings a revenue o f 0.
This payoff structure is intended to capture, in a very simplified way, the fact that a 
project that has chances to prosper, from the technical point o f view, may not always be 
worth undertaking for a firm (i.e. when it is known to pay 0 instead o f B). In the absence 
of other considerations, an employer will prefer to have the final say over the decision, and 
be able to block projects that, even if successful, would deliver meagerly.
Information Structure. Prior to the selection o f the project, the worker receives im­
perfect information about the state of the world. If state x  has occurred the worker receives 
signal X with probability p(e, a), depending on the innate ability o f the worker, o, and his
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choice o f effort e € [0, oo). The function p { . , .) is assumed to be bounded (p G (1/2,1)), 
concave in both arguments, and with positive cross partial derivative (pea(e, a) >  0), imply­
ing that the marginal return o f an extra unit of effort is higher for more able workers. The 
effort o f the worker brings a disutility o f e and is not observable by the employer, which 
creates a moral hazard problem.
The employer receives information about the (private) payoffs of the projects, that is, 
observes whether each o f the successful projects would pay B  or 0. Again, if the employer 
keeps authority and observes that one o f the projects pays 0 under success, she will impose 
the adoption o f the other project. The chances o f this happening are assumed to be A, where 
A G (0 ,1 /2 ). The fact that A is a low number indicates that the need for intervention under 
authority is not very high (i.e., in most occasions the project adopted coincides with the 
proposal o f the worker).
The market only observes the success or failure o f  the project after it has been under­
taken. Equivalently, it observes the project choice and the state o f the world. It does not 
observe the private payoff to the employer, and therefore cannot infer who is to be given 
credit for the project choice.
Ability. The ability of the worker a is symmetrically uncertain at the initial stage. 
It is common knowledge, however, that it can be only of two types, high and low, a G 
{h, /} , h >  I, with both types being equally likely.
Contracting and wages. Following both the delegation and the career concems lit­
erature, I assume that wages and projects cannot be conditioned. This further implies that 
both the result o f the project and the payoffs to the employer are not contractible variables.
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However, due to the fact that the performance o f the worker is known to the outside market, 
career concems incentives can be provided. Following the observation o f the result of the 
project and the allocation of decision rights, the market makes a wage offer to the worker, 
with the current employer being allowed a counteroffer. The worker then decides for whom 
to work. This decision is modelled in the following way: with probability 1 — u the worker 
accepts the highest offer. With probability n, however, the worker leaves his current em­
ployer irrespective of the wage offer received. This simplified behaviour is consistent with 
a rational agent that in a proportion u o f cases receives a large and negative utility shock. 
Decision rights. Two alternative decision-making arrangements are considered: 
-Authority: Here the employer has the ultimate right to choose her preferred project, 
after consultation with the worker and observing her own information
-Delegation: The decision-making is delegated to the worker, with no interference 
from the employer.
Timing: To sum up, consider the timing o f the game. Period 1; (i) The employer of­
fers the worker an unconditional wage and an allocation of decision rights; (ii) Following 
the selection o f x  by nature, the worker puts effort e and receives a signal about the state 
of the world, which indicates the project with more chances o f being successful. Similarly, 
the employer observes the payoffs o f both projects conditional on success; (Hi) If decision 
rights are delegated to the worker, he chooses the project. Otherwise he communicates his 
signal to the employer, who in light o f this and his own information selects a project; (iv) 
The result o f the project is observed by everybody and the employer receives her corre­
sponding payoff. Period 2; (i) The market makes a wage offer to the worker, after which
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the employer decides whether to match it or not. Then the worker decides for whom to 
work, (ii)-(iv) are as in Period 1.
1.4 Analysis
1.4.1 The first best choice of effort
Start by defining the precision p of a worker undertaking information acquisition effort e 
who is believed to belong to the high ability group with probability q. The precision of 
the signal of such a worker is p{e,q)  =  qp{e, h) {1 — q)p{e, I). Note that the precision 
function inherits all the properties o fp ( ., .).
I characterise now the first best solution. With contractible effort and a prior q =  1/2, 
the problem for the employer in each period becomes:
m a x ^ e , 1/2) (1 — X)B — e
with a rearranged first order condition:
The first-best effort depends positively on the chances o f the worker affecting the 
final decision, (1 — A), as well as on payoffs from a profitable and successful effort, B.  
Note that since the agent is risk-neutral and with unlimited liability, the first best could be 
achieved by a well-designed contract which conditioned wages on payoffs. The concern 
of this chapter, however, is on economic situations in which the payoffs received by the 
principal are private, but the result o f the project is observed by outsiders.
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1.4.2 The value of a worker in the second period
Proceeding by backward induction, I study the expected value V  that a worker o f ability 
q has for a principal in the second period, V(q)  =  (1 — A)[p(0,ç) — Since there
is no future period, the worker incurs no effort and his precision is p(0, q), still higher, by 
assumption, that the prior 1/2, held by the worker.
I consider now the posterior ability ç o f a worker following his performance in period 
1. If he is believed to have put effort e and is known to have received the correct signal 
about the world, Bayesian updating gives his posterior ability as qs(e) =  Pr[a =  h | 
success, ^  Similarly for a worker who has received the wrong signal with
certainty, the revised probability is q r i^  =  Pr[u =  h | fa i lu r e ,^
Since the prior ability of a worker is 1/2, it is obvious that >  1/2 >  Çf (^ .
Lastly, I calculate the difference in value of a worker following success and failure in 
period 1:
-  yp(g(e)) =  (1 -  A)[p(0,çg(e)) -p ( 0 ,g r ( ^ ) ] B  >  0
In a competitive labour market the worker is paid his expected value and workers 
with a record o f success in period 1 are able to command higher compensation. That, in 
turn, gives them incentives to be informed in the first period. I show below how the current 
employer o f a worker can affect the difference in compensation, and therefore the effort of 
a worker, by adjusting the decision rights allocation.
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1.4.3 Delegation
I turn now to consider the problem in the first period by comparing the two alternative de­
cision rights arrangements. Start with delegation. When the worker is entirely responsible 
for the decision, his success or failure is free o f the noise introduced by the employer. Sim­
ilarly, the information held by the current employer and the market is identical: just the 
success or failure o f the project chosen. With symmetric information a competitive mar­
ket appears, and the worker is paid its expected value. Formally, iü^(ç(e)) =  Fg(g(e)) and 
(ç (^ ) =  1^  period 1, the problem for the worker is:
m axp(e, l/2)[V^(g(e)) -  Vf (ç(^ )] -  e 
By rearranging the first order condition and evaluating at e =  e^:
“  [Vs^qie^^)) -  Vp(9(e«))]
Comparing this expression with (1.1), it can be seen that the level o f incentives is 
suboptimal. The profits earned by the employer under delegation are:
n "  =  (1 -  A )^e", 1 /2 )B  (1.2)
Expression (1.2) shows the two drawbacks o f delegation. On one side the precision 
of a motivated worker is useful to the employer only in the (1 — A) percentage o f cases in 
which there is coincidence of interests ex post. On the other, the employer earns profits 
only during the first period. By failing to have superior information over the ability of the 
worker, the employer is forced to pay competitive wages in period 2, and therefore cannot 
earn a rent on him.
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1.4.4 Authority
The analysis is a bit more complicated in this subsection, since it deals with the study of 
the winner’s curse effect. Since the employer has the final say, the decision-making process 
is ex post efficient, using all the information available at a particular time. With a proba­
bility A the employer will not rubber-stamp the proposal of the worker, instead choosing 
an alternative project, so that the choice of project is not one-to-one related to the signal of 
the worker. Because the market cannot observe directly the signal but the employer can, 
asymmetric information about the ability o f the worker appears. The corresponding win­
ner’s curse is a well-known phenomenon studied first in the auction literature. In the labour 
market Greenwald [7] was the first to show that the market offers will lie strictly above 
the lower bound o f the worker’s value only if there is exogenous turnover with positive 
probability.
To illustrate the mechanics of the winner’s curse and show why it reduces the future 
wage and the sensitivity of the wage to the quality o f the signal, imagine that the project 
selected has been a success. The market is unsure as to whom allocate the credit, but knows 
that with probability t s { ^  =  (i_A)p(gï/2)+A^^^  ^ the project has been chosen by the
worker (i.e. the value o f the worker is Vs{q{^) and with complementary probability it was 
chosen by the employer, and the value of the worker is V/r(g(^. The employer knows the 
value with certainty.
Imagine that the market naively offers the worker his expected value, that is an offer 
of ts{e)Vs{q{e) +  [1 — ts{^]VF{q{e).  The employer will match the market’s offer when 
he observes the worker’s value to be Vs{q{^.  It follows that the market will employ the
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worker only when he is o f lower ability, paying him a wage above his value, and therefore 
making a loss on him.
Taking into account that with probability u the worker will leave his current employer 
regardless of the wage offer, the equilibrium wage offer by the market must solve:
u {ts{e)V s{q{^  +  [1 -
(1 -  -  ^5(^1 =  0
The expression above illustrates that the market makes profits on the unconditional 
quitters, and losses on the workers on whom the employer ceases to match the market’s 
offer. The losses made on these last workers has received in the literature the name o f the 
winner’s curse effect. Note that this effect is high, reducing the equilibrium wages, when 
exogenous turnover (u) is low and the importance of the employer’s private information (A) 
is high. Solving W g{q{^) from the expression above,
=  '^^s{e)Vs{q{^ +  [1 -  t5(e)]Vp(g(e)
Note that (ç(e)) varies between V piq i^  and ts i^ V s{q {^  +  [1 — ts{j^]VF{q(^  
as u moves from 0 to 1. Without exogenous turnover the market employs the worker only 
when he is of low ability and pays him accordingly. With complete exogenous turnover 
there is no winner’s curse and the worker is paid his expected value.
Similarly,
,„A(„cp.) _  u tF (ê)V s{q {ê)  +  [1 -  tF (ë)]V F(g(ê)
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where tp ie) =  ^ 2) • What a worker is paid following success ex­
ceeds what he is paid following failure by an amount W g{q{^) — W p{q{^) <  Vs{q{e)) —
V F b(^ ).
The problem o f the worker under authority becomes:
maxp(e, 1/2) [wg(g(e)) -  w j{q {^ )]  -  e
Rearranging the first order condition and evaluating at =  e, the effort provided by 
the worker under authority solves:
>V2) u4{q{ê)) -  v4{q{?))
The profits earned by the employer under authority are:
=  (1 -  A)^e^, 1 /2 )S  +  A (1 -  p{e^, 1 /2)) B  +  (1 -  u)R
The employer is able now to extract profits from three different sources. The first 
one is due to the worker’s effort to gather information in order to appear more informed. 
Further, the decision-making process is more efftcient ex post, since it uses also the infor­
mation of the employer. Lastly, the employer is able to extract a rent R  from the worker in 
the second period, due to her informational advantage over the market.
1.4.5 Authority versus Delegation
I conclude this section by presenting the theoretical results
Proposition 1 The effort provided by the worker is always higher under delegation 
than under authority, (e^ >  e^)
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Proof Note that Wg{q) -  Wp{q) <  Vs{q) — as A G [0,1/2] and u G [0,1]. The
rest follows from the concavity of p. ■
The intuition o f Proposition 1 is very straightforward. When the employer holds 
superior information about the worker’s ability, the market offers a flatter wage for fear of 
suffering the winner’s curse. Career concern incentives are weak and the worker takes too 
little effort.
The following Proposition compares profits under the two arrangements:
Proposition 2 Under some parameter values it is profitable fo r the employer to delegate
decision-making rights to the worker
Proof Make u =  0 and A arbitrarily close to 0. It is straightforward that — 11  ^ =
[p(e^, 1/2) — p(e^, 1/2)] B, which is always positive by Proposition 1. ■
1.5 Conclusion
This chapter identifies a new advantage of delegation over authority. When career con­
cerns effects are important and the effect o f the winner’s curse effect is strong in the labour 
market, small advantages in information held by the current employer can be highly detri­
mental to the incentives o f a worker. Delegating decision-making rights can therefore be 
used as a way to establish an "arm’s length relationship", credibly committing not to exploit 
privileged information on the worker’s ability.
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Chapter 2 
Strategic Decisions, Motivation and 
Leadership Styles
Joint work with Marc Moller
2.1 Introduction
It is often argued that leaders should be good at listening and responsive to opinions other 
than their own. Morris, Willkers and Knasel [11], for instance, assert that “the act of lis­
tening is all the time helping to mark you out as a leader and to build your colleagues’ 
commitment to you”. Since the early 70s, the management literature on leadership has 
mostly shared this view. Democratic decision-makers, who seek ample advice and build 
consensus around their decisions, have been generally regarded as more effective than those 
who adopt a command-and-control, top-down style o f leadership. Implicit in this view is 
the notion that a better decision is reached when a multitude of perspectives and opinions 
are taken into account. For example, Heifetz [6] states that “autocratic decision-making as­
sumes that authorities have little to learn, and it limits their ability to test basic substantive, 
political and moral assumptions”. But the presumed superiority o f democratic leaders also 
stems from a new emphasis on the effects o f decisions on the motivation o f subordinates. 
Korsgaard, Shweiger and Sapienza [8] state that “a more complete view o f effective deci­
sion processes should consider not only the quality o f decisions but also the impact o f such 
processes on team members’ affective responses, such as commitment to the decision”. In
28
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this respect, an inclusive approach to decision-making is widely believed to be better at 
enhancing the motivation of subordinates.
Yet, many leaders have adopted autocratic, decisive styles and thrived as a result of 
it; think of Jack Welch at General Electric or Margaret Thatcher in British politics. Many 
successful leaders pay little regard to the reaction o f their subordinates to their decisions, 
even at the risk o f alienating them. Instead the ability to take risks and stand by one’s 
beliefs is often deemed to be one o f the greatest assets o f these leaders.
Furthermore, empirical evidence supporting the superiority o f a democratic style of 
leadership remains inconclusive. Locke and Sweiger [10], for instance, review 46 studies 
testing the effects o f participative decision-making on productivity. While 22% o f these 
studies find a democratic style to induce higher team productivity, another 22% report the 
superiority of an autocratic style, and 56% find no significant difference*. In a similar ex­
ercise, Locke and Sweiger find that 60% of studies conclude that democratic styles lead to 
higher group satisfaction than autocratic styles, whereas only 9% of studies report the op­
posite finding. In short, democratic leaders may produce happier, perhaps more motivated, 
subordinates, but not necessarily more productive ones.
Our aim in this chapter is to study theoretically the trade-offs between different lead­
ership styles. We posit that leadership is a combination o f the ability to make good deci­
sions and to motivate subordinates in charge o f implementing those decisions^. We view
 ^ See also Amason [1], Filley, House and Kerry [3], Latham, Winters and Locke [9], 
Wagner [19], Wagner and Gooding [20] and Wagner, Leana, Locke and Schweiger [21].
 ^ This view is common in the management literature on leadership. See, for instance,
Vroom and Yetton [18]. For other papers in the economics literature, see Rotemberg and 
Saloner [13], Hermalin [7], Goel and Thakor [4] and Van den Steen [17].
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these two aspects as complementary. The success o f a (good) decision depends partly on 
the effort spent by the workforce to implement it. We propose a model in which the leader 
receives private information about the best choice o f project for the organisation. He has to 
make two choices: whether or not to seek further evidence, and how to decide among the 
alternative projects.
The main trade-off o f the model arises because the leader’s private information might 
not point in the direction that is most effective for motivational purposes. This occurs, 
for instance, when the leader privately believes that some project is the most likely to be 
successful, but the worker would be more motivated with respect to another project, either 
because public evidence supports it or because its productivity, if it were the right choice, 
would be higher. In such cases, the leader might be willing to distort his decision and 
choose a suboptimal project which induces higher effort from the subordinate. We show 
that in an incomplete contracts world this is inefficient, as the leader should be transparent 
in his decision-making and let the worker adjust his effort according to the organisation’s 
prospects. It is a tempting response because the leader does not fully internalise the cost 
of the worker’s effort. A trade-off therefore arises in our model between the quality of 
a decision and the motivation of subordinates induced by it. There is evidence that real 
decision-makers explicitly recognise the existence o f this trade-off. For instance, Thomas 
[16] states that “leaders struggle with the following problem all the time. From a leadership 
point o f view, you always want to move toward telling the hard truths and helping people 
cope with the realities of change. But as a manager, you might be more inclined to minimize 
the complexity of a situation so things can run smoothly for as long as possible.”
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In this framework we compare democratic and autocratic leadership styles, using the 
self-confidence o f the leader as a differentiating variable. We assume that the quality of the 
private information received by different types o f leaders is identical. However, while some 
leaders are “realistic” about the quality of their private information, other leaders overes­
timate it, and are therefore “overconfident”^ We first show that an overconfident leader is 
less likely to compromise in his decisions. Since he (wrongly) believes that he is very well 
informed, he is unwilling to distort his project choice in order to boost the motivation of the 
workers. Hence, his behavioural bias makes him more willing to “tell the hard truths” and 
make the right decisions, even at the cost of reducing the workers’ motivation. A realistic 
leader, on the other hand, understands the limits o f his private information and is willing to 
compromise in his project choice thereby adopting an inefiScient decision.
While more efficient at taking the right decisions given their personal opinion, we 
show that overconfident leaders fail to gather enough external evidence which might com­
plement and improve their private information. Since such leaders overestimate the qual­
ity of their private information, they undervalue the benefits that consulting with external 
sources might generate, thus devoting too few resources to such consultation. In our model 
a trade-off arises endogenously between the acquisition o f information and its use. Real­
istic leaders are more democratic. They frequently seek external advice and they take into 
account their subordinates’ reaction to their decisions. Overconfident leaders, on the other 
hand, fail to consult enough and disregard their subordinates’ motivation, thereby adopt-
 ^ In reality, leaders also differ in their ability, i.e. in the quality o f their private information, and it is 
beneficial to appoint a more able leader. We prefer to abstract fi'om these differences and focus on the 
alternative styles induced by different levels o f self-confidence.
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ing a more autocratic approach to decision-making. In this chapter we evaluate the relative 
benefits from appointing an overconfident leader. We find that appointing an overconfident 
leader improves an organizations efficiency if  external consultation is sufficiently costly. 
If external consultation is expensive the relative disadvantage o f inefficiently low external 
consultation is outweighed by the leader’s improved decision-making"^.
The plan o f this chapter is as follows. In Section 2.2 we briefly discuss the related 
literature. Section 2.3 contains the model. In Section 2.4 we deal with motivational issues 
whereas Section 2.5 discusses a leader’s incentive for external consultation. In Section 
2.6 we consider the relationship between efficiency and a leader’s level o f overconfidence. 
Section 2.7 discusses the robustness o f our results and Section 2.8 concludes. Proofs which 
do not serve the intuition for our results are relegated to the Appendix.
2.2 Related work
The economic literature on leadership so far has failed to consider how decision-making 
and motivational aspects interrelate and sometimes conflict with each other. Hermalin [7] 
proposes a model o f team production where the leader does essentially the same task as any 
of his subordinates: put non-contractible effort into a common project. The leader differs 
from his subordinates in that he is privately informed about the productivity o f the project. 
As he benefits from any extra effort incurred, the leader cannot credibly transmit to the
In this paper we assume that a leadership style is uniquely associated with each leader. In reality, however, 
there are examples of leaders who have changed their styles according to the circumstances. The Economist 
[15], for instance, comments that “Mr Blair used to be liked because he said things that nearly everyone 
could agree with and because he seemed to be a decent and reasonably normal chap. But now Mr Blair is 
widely seen as a resolute leader, prepared to take risks for what he believes in.”
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team that the productivity of the project is high. However, Hermalin shows that the leader 
can signal this fact by exerting high effort himself; a mechanism that he calls “leading by 
example”. While we share with Hermalin the notion that the leader has some privileged 
information about the company, in our model the leader’s task is to take decisions, rather 
than to engage in the implementation process. Both views are, however, complementary. 
Hermalin’s “leading by example” mechanism is probably important in small teams where 
subordinates can observe a leader’s effort. On the other hand our model applies to larger 
organisations where subordinates and leaders cannot monitor each other and often do not 
even know each other personally. Rotemberg and Saloner [13] examine a framework where 
subordinates can create innovative ideas and the company can choose whether or not to test 
them. Because both activities are costly, the company will test only the most promising 
ideas and subordinates devote inefficiently little effort to innovation. Rotemberg and Sa­
loner show how the company can gain by appointing a leader who empathises with the 
subordinates and is therefore not completely profit-maximising. The reason is that such 
a leader will test more ideas than optimal ex post, thereby creating an atmosphere where 
innovation is encouraged. Rotemberg and Saloner’s setup applies to organisations where 
information/ideas reside at the bottom, whereas in our model information resides at the top.
A large part o f the literature has focused on “irrational” leaders. Goel and Thakor 
[4] argue that managers who underestimate project risks have a higher likelihood o f win­
ning in tournaments and thus of getting elected as a leader. We share with them the study 
o f overconfidence as a leader’s attribute. Our focus, however, is on the relative benefits of 
different levels o f overconfidence, rather than the forces which make leaders gain their po-
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sition. Lastly, a few studies, such as Prendergast [12] or Branderburger and Ben-Polak [2] 
find that a decision-maker may avoid the project that he considers to be the best in favor of 
a different project that another agent who is less informed regards highly. Prendergast pro­
poses a very simple reason; the use of subjective compensation by firms rewards workers if 
they choose to do those projects that their superiors prefer. Branderburger and Ben-Polak’s 
focus is on the stock market, where they show how the fixation o f managers with the share 
price can lead them to adopt the strategies that are preferred by investors. Unlike those 
papers, however, we show that appointing an overconfident decision-maker is a potential 
solution to the problem.
2.3 The model
Our environment consists of a leader and a single worker; the leader is in charge o f making 
decisions and the worker has to implement these decisions. More specifically, the leader 
has to choose between two alternative and mutually exclusive projects, d G {0 ,1} and the 
worker has to choose whether to exert effort (e =  1) or not (e =  0) in implementing the 
project.
There are two states of the world X  G {0 ,1}. We assume that even if  the worker ex­
erts effort, the success o f a project is not guaranteed. Success depends also on the decision 
matching the state o f the world. If the leader chooses d =  X , and the worker exerts ef­
fort, then the project creates a revenue of >  0, but otherwise revenue is zero. Projects 
are heterogeneous in the sense that one of them leads to higher potential revenue than the 
other. Without loss o f generality we normalize Vi — 1 and Vo =  "u E (0,1).
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Information. The state o f the world, X ,  is initially unknown, but it is common knowl­
edge that both states are equally likely to occur. The decision-maker can gather information 
about X  from two different sources: a costless private signal received as a result o f being in 
a leadership position, and a costly external consultation or gathering o f evidence that might 
improve the information provided by his private signal.
The leader has the opportunity to consult external experts or conduct research in order 
to determine the state of the world. This consultation may be successful, in which case it 
provides perfect knowledge o f the state o f the world, or it may fail and produce no evidence 
at all. We assume that consultation is more likely to be successful when more resources 
are spent on it. More specifically, the leader chooses a probability p  €  [0,1] with which 
consultation reveals the state o f the world and pays a cost 7 p  ^where 7  >  0 .
If consultation fails the leader relies solely on his own opinion about X .  We assume 
that he receives a private signal, S  G {0 ,1}, o f imperfect precision tt =  Pr(S' =  X ) G
(è ’ i)-
Overconfidence. Note that tt represents the leader’s ability to make the right decision 
when he has not obtained external evidence. The objective o f this model is to investigate the 
implications o f appointing an overconfident leader. We therefore allow for the possibility 
that the leader believes the precision o f his private signal to be tt® >  tt. Then (tt® — tt) is 
the leader’s level o f overconfidence, and a leader with tt® =  tt is a “realistic” leader. We 
assume that tt and tt® are common knowledge^
® Common knowledge here implies that the leader knows that the worker believes that the signal’s precision 
is 7T and that the worker knows that the leader believes that the signal’s precision is vr°.
2.3 The model 36
Effort decision. The worker pays a cost C  o f exerting effort which is privately ob­
served and uniformly distributed in [0,1].
Payoffs and contracts. Both agents are assumed to be risk neutral. We adopt an 
incomplete contracting approach by positing that restrictions on the form o f contracts make 
it unfeasible to fully compensate the worker for his effort. In other words, it is not possible 
to “sell the firm to the worker”. Instead we assume that the worker receives a fixed share 
P G (0,1) o f the project’s revenue.
Let D{X^ d) denote a dummy variable which takes the value 1 when X  =  d  and 0 
otherwise and note that we can write the project’s revenue as R  =  D{X,d)eVd.  Letting 
R l =  {1 — P)R  and R w  =  PR  denote the leader’s and the worker’s share o f the project’s 
revenue, the leader’s payoff becomes Pl =  R l — and the worker’s payoff is Pw  =  
R w  — Ce. Total surplus \ s P  =  Pl ~\- P w  — d)eVd — — Ce.
Expectations of a leader with overconfidence tt® will be denoted by E ttq. E x  and 
are the leader’s expectations conditional on the consultation process being successful 
or not but before he learns X  or S  respectively^.
Timing. The timing of events is as follows, (i) Nature determines the state of the 
world X  and the worker’s cost C  of exerting effort, (ii) The leader chooses the probability 
p  o f finding evidence about X .  If evidence is found the state o f the world X  is revealed to 
everybody. If no evidence is found the leader receives the private signal S  about the state 
of the world. (Hi) The leader chooses the project d. (iv) The worker chooses whether to 
exert effort or not and the project’s revenue is shared.
® Note that we have used lower case letters to denote choice variables and greek letters to denote the exo- 
geneous parameters of the model.
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2.4 Motivating subordinates
The aim o f this section is to show that, when there is uncertainty about the state o f the 
world, the decision-maker may face a trade-off between making the right decision and 
motivating his subordinate to implement it. To show this we solve the game by backward 
induction. Note first that in period (iv) it is optimal for the worker to exert effort if  and only 
if his expected gains from doing so are larger than his costs C. In turn, the expected gains 
from exerting effort depend on the decision d taken by the leader in (Hi) and on whether 
the consultation process in period (ii) has been successful or not. We consider the different 
outcomes of the consultation process separately, and study how the optimal effort choice 
of the worker affects the leader’s project choice.
2.4.1 Motivation in the absence of uncertainty
Consider first the case where the consultation process has been successful and the state 
of the world has been revealed to everybody. In such case the leader’s optimal choice of 
project is straightforward. If he chooses X  then the worker will not exert effort as the
project has no possibility of delivering any revenue. If instead he chooses d =  X  then the 
worker will exert effort if  his cost C  o f doing so is smaller than his share o f the revenue 
/?Vx- As C  is uniformly distributed in [0,1] the worker will exert effort with probability 
The leader’s expected revenue from choosing d =  X  is therefore (1 — /3)^Vx >  0 so 
that d =  X  is the optimal strategy for the leader.
In Section 2.5 we will discuss the leader’s choice o f the probability p  for finding 
evidence. For this purpose we need to determine the revenue that the leader can expect if
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he finds unambiguous evidence about X .  As both states o f the world are equally likely ex 
ante we have E ^ R l =  |(1  -  /?)/?(! +
The following lemma summarizes these findings.
Lemma 1 Consider the subgame after evidence about the state o f  the world has been 
found. In the unique equilibrium o f this subgame the leader chooses d — X  and the worker 
exerts effort if  and only if  d =  X  and C  <  pVx- The leader’s ex ante expected revenue 
from finding evidence is E ^ R l =  \  {l — +  v^).
Note that the leader would prefer to observe X  =  \  rather than A  =  0, since project 
1 delivers higher revenue and makes the worker more likely to exert effort. However, once 
X  =  0 has been observed, the leader has no incentive to choose d =  1, since this would 
reduce the probability of adopting the productive project and reduce the motivation of the 
worker. In the absence of uncertainty about X  there is no trade-off between the quality of 
a decision and the motivation induced by it.
2.4.2 Motivation in the presence of uncertainty
Suppose that the consultation process has been unsuccessful and that the leader has to rely 
solely on his private signal when making his project choice. Note that from the worker’s 
perspective both projects are equally likely to be the right choice. However, contingent 
on being the right choice, project 1 leads to higher gains than project 0. For motivational 
purposes the leader is therefore inclined to favour project 1. If a realistic leader with ttq =  tt 
observes 5  =  0 then assuming that the worker exerts effort the leader expects a revenue
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of (1 — P>)t:v if he chooses project 0 and (1 — /?)(! — tt) if  he chooses project 1. If the 
signal’s precision is small compared to the heterogeneity o f the projects’ revenues, that is 
if  7T <  then the leader’s expected revenue from project 1 would be larger than his 
expected revenue from project 0 irrespective of his signal. In this case the leader’s favoured 
project would always be identical to the one which is optimal for motivational purposes and 
the leader’s optimal project choice would trivially be d =  1. In order to restrict attention to 
the more interesting case we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1 The signal S is valuable, that is tt >  .
Assumption 1 states that conditional on the worker exerting effort regardless o f the 
project choice, the leader’s expected revenue is higher when he makes his project choice 
contingent on his signal, d =  S.
However, the worker’s compensation depends on the outcome o f the production pro­
cess and his effort might be influenced by the leader’s project choice. Hence, in the pres­
ence o f uncertainty about X ,  the leader may be inclined to choose project 1 after observing 
signal 0 even when Assumption 1 holds.
To show this point suppose that the leader is realistic (ttq =  tt) and that he follows 
the efficient strategy d =  S. The worker will exert effort on project 0 if C <  and on 
project 1 if C <  (dir. After observing 5  =  0 the leader thus gains by deviating to d =  1 
if  and only if (1 — /?)/?7t^ î;^  <  (1 -  /?)/37t(1 — tt), that is, if  tt <  We assume that 
this is the case, so that a realistic leader cannot credibly commit to choose d =  S, and
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overconfidence may improve the efficiency of the decision-making. We therefore make 
the following assumption.
Assumption 2 The signal S  is sufficiently inaccurate to prevent a realistic leader from 
an efficient project choice, that is ir <
The reason why a realistic leader does not find it optimal to follow d =  S  is that, 
while both agents benefit from a higher level of revenue, only the worker pays the cost 
o f implementing the project. Because the leader benefits from an increase in the effort of 
the worker without paying its extra cost, he has an incentive to motivate the worker with 
his project choice. This increase in motivation is not costless for the leader, as it requires 
adopting a project that he considers less likely to be the right choice. Under Assumption 2 
the benefits o f this increase in motivation are higher than its costs. The gains from distort­
ing the project choice depend positively on the heterogeneity in the projects revenues and 
negatively on the precision o f the leader’s private signal. Although under Assumption 2 a 
realistic leader cannot adopt the efficient project choice, an overconfident leader may do 
so. The following Lemma characterizes equilibrium behaviour for different levels of over­
confidence 7T°. The Intuitive Criterion is used as a selection device. Strictly speaking, such 
criterion is defined for signaling games but its extension to our case is straightforward and 
its definition is omitted.
Lemma 2 Consider the sub game after no evidence about the state o f  the world has 
been found. Depending on the leader’s level o f overconfidence there exist different types o f  
equilibria.
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•  Jf <  (1 +  2'kv )^~  ^ then in every equilibrium the leader chooses d =  1 
irrespective o f  his signal and the worker exerts effort on project 1 i f  and only if  
C  <  . The leader’s ex ante expected revenue from using his private signal is
e ^ r l  =  1(1 -  m -
• I f  {l-\- 27tu^)“  ^ <  7To <  +  then there exists a unique equilibrium which
survives the Intuitive Criterion. The leader chooses d = \ i f  S  =  \. When S  =  Qhe 
chooses d — 1 with probability q =  d =  0 with probability
1 — q where 0 <  g <  1. The worker exerts effort on project 1 if  and only if  
C <  ^  exerts effort on project 0 if  and only if  C  <  f irv  . The leader’s ex
ante expected revenue from using his private signal is E^^Rl =  |(1  —
•  I f  {1 +  v^)~^ <  7To then there exists a unique equilibrium. The leader chooses 
d =  S. The worker exerts effort if  and only if  C  <  ^TrVd. The leader’s ex ante 
expected revenue from using his private signal is E^^Rl =  ^(1 — /?)/?7r7To(l +  v )^.
Proof We first show that there cannot be an equilibrium in which the leader chooses 
d =  0 with positive probability after 5  =  1. By contradiction suppose that there is such 
an equilibrium. For any project choice d o f the leader let Wd denote the worker’s be­
lief about the probability with which the leader has chosen the right project. The worker 
will optimally exert effort if and only if C  <  ^VdWd- Now suppose that 5  =  1. As 
in equilibrium the leader chooses d =  0 with positive probability it has to hold that 
(1 — ^)^(1 — 'Kq)wqv'^  >  (1 — However, as Wj G [1 — 7r,7r] it holds that
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(1 -  'Kq)wqv  ^ <  (1 -  7ro)7Tf^  <  (1 — 7ro)7r <  (1 — 7r)7To <  TToWi which is a contradic­
tion. It follows that in every equilibrium the leader chooses d =  1 if  S' =  1. We will 
now discuss the remaining possibilities for an equilibrium. Suppose first that the leader 
chooses d =  1 irrespective of his signal S. As the leader does not condition the project 
choice on his signal, the worker knows that the leader chooses the right project with prob­
ability It is therefore optimal for the worker to exert effort on project 1 if  and only 
C  <  \ .  If the worker observes the off-equilibrium choice d =  0 we suppose that 
he believes that 5  =  0 with probability w  G [0,1]. It is then optimal to exert effort on 
project 0 if and only if (7 <  /3v{w7r +  (1 — w )(l — t t ) ) .  Given the worker’s equilib­
rium behaviour the leader’s expected revenue from following the equilibrium strategy is 
(1 -  /3)j3^7ro if 5  =  1 and (1 — -  ttq) if 5  =  0. The leader’s expected revenue
from deviating to d =  0 is (1 — /?)/?(! — 7ro)(w7r 4- (1 — w )(l — 7t))v  ^ if 5  =  1 and 
(1 — /?)/?7To(u;7r +  (1 — w ){ l  -  n))v ‘^ if  5  =  0. Possible gains from deviating are larger if 
5  =  0 and deviations are not profitable if | (1 — ttq) >  +  (1 — w )(l — 7t))v  ^which is
equivalent to ttq <  (1 +  2 { w 7t  4- (1 — w )(l — Note that this threshold is minimal
for w =  1. For ttq <  (1 +  2Trv )^~  ^ choosing d =  1 for all 5  is an equilibrium no matter the 
off-equilibrium belief of the worker.
The leader’s ex ante expected revenue from using his private signal is E^^Rl =
1(1 -  + 1(1 -  TTo)) =  J(1 -
For (1 27tv )^~  ^ <  7To <  (1 +  2(1 — 7t)v )^~  ^ however, choosing d =  1 for all 5  is
an equilibrium only if  the worker believes that 5  =  1 with positive probability after d =  0, 
that is if  w <  1. We will now show that for (1 +  27tv )^~  ^ <  ttq <  (1 +  2(1 — Tr)v )^~  ^ such
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beliefs are ruled out by the Intuitive Criterion. To see this consider a leader of type 5  =  1. 
For any possible off-equilibrium belief of the worker the leader’s payoff from deviating to 
d =  0 is smaller than (1 — /3)/9(l — 7ro)7ru^ . His payoff from following the equilibrium 
path is (1 -  It holds that (1 — 'Kq)'kv  ^ <  7To(1 -  7t)u  ^ <  1(1 — ttq) <  where
the second inequality follows from ttq <  (1 -I- 2(1 — 7t)v )^~ .^ This implies that a leader 
o f type 5 = 1  cannot profit from a deviation to d =  0 for any belief o f the worker. For 
(1 4- 27tv )^~  ^ <  7To <  (1 +  2(1 — 7t)v'^ )~^  the equilibrium in which d =  1 for all 5  is 
therefore ruled out by the Intuitive Criterion.
Now suppose that the leader chooses d =  1 if 5  =  1 and d =  1 with probability 
g if 5  =  0. The worker can calculate the probability that the right project was chosen 
using Bayesian updating. For d =  0 the worker knows that 5  =  0 such that it is optimal 
for him to exert effort if and only if C < If d =  1 exerting effort is optimal if and 
only if C <  — K If 5  =  0 the leader has to be indifferent between choosing d =  0
or d =  1. If he chooses d =  0 his expected revenue is (1 — !5)P'KqV^  and for d =  1 he
expects {I — ^)^{1 — Setting these two revenues equal and solving for q
leads to q =  Ibat Assumption 1 implies that the denominator o f q
is positive. The nominator is positive if and only if ttq <  (1 +  u^)~^and g <  1 if  and only
if  (1 -f <  ttq. It remains to check that it is not profitable for the leader to choose
d =  0 if 5  =  1. This deviation gives the leader an expected revenue o f (1 — /0)/5(l — 7ro)7ru^  
whereas by following the equilibrium strategy he gets (1 — As 1 — ttq <  ttq
this deviation is not profitable. For (1 -|-27ru^)“  ^ <  ttq <  ( l  +  u^)“  ^the proposed strategies 
therefore constitute an equilibrium and the leader’s ex ante expected revenue from using
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his private signal is =  |( 1  -  /3)^ ^(1 -  g)7ro7ro^  +  (%o +  g (l -  =
Finally suppose that the leader chooses d =  S. The worker optimally exerts effort 
if  and only if  C <  ^irVd- If the leader’s signal is S  his expected revenue from following 
the equilibrium is (1 — ^)^T^QVg. By deviating he expects (1 — /?)/?(! — 'Kq)'kV^_s . As 
7To >  1 — 7To a deviation can only be profitable if  5  =  0. Deviating after S' =  0 is not 
profitable if and only if 1 — ttq <  ttqU^  which is equivalent to (1 +  v^)~^ <  ttq. If this 
equilibrium is played the leader’s ex ante expected revenue from using his private signal is
Figure 1 shows that the equilibrium probability q o f choosing project 1 when the 
leader’s signal is 0 is a decreasing function o f the leader’s level o f overconfidence ttq. It 
also shows that the payoff which the leader expects to obtain from using his private signal, 
E^^Pl , is an increasing function o f ttq. To understand the intuition o f this equilibrium note 
first that when ttq is below (1 +  the leader is not very confident about his ability
to predict the state o f the world. As a result he regards the costs o f distorting the project 
choice as low. Since in equilibrium the leader chooses d =  1 independently o f his private 
signal, his expected revenue is independent of his level o f confidence about the precision 
of such signal. However, as ttq increases above (1 +  27tv^)~^, q decreases. The leader starts 
using his private signal, and his expected revenue increases in ttq for two reasons. The first 
reason is that as ttq increases, q decreases and the decision-making becomes more efficient, 
thus increasing both the likelihood of choosing the right project and the expected effort of 
the worker. The second reason is that, as ttq increases, the leader becomes more and more
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confident in his ability to choose the right project. Lastly when ttq >  (1 +  v^)~^ the project 
choice of the leader is completely efficient in equilibrium and the increase in the leader’s 
expected revenue is solely due to the second reason.
Figure 1
1
TTO
0
2.5 Consulting advisors
In this section we move to period (ii) to analyse the leader’s decision to consult externally 
and seek further evidence about the state of the world X . The leader takes into account the 
payoffs that he expects to obtain in the subgames where evidence about X  has been found 
or not. He chooses p, the probability that evidence will be found, to maximize his expected
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payoff that is
p* =  arg m ax p E ^ R l +  {1  -  p)E^^Rl -  
p€[0,l]
Lemma 1 has shown that the leader’s ex ante expected revenue from finding evidence 
is E ^ R l =  ^{1 — P)P{1 +  v^). According to Lemma 2 the leader’s ex ante expected 
revenue from using his private signal E^^Rl depends on his level o f overconfidence. The 
leader’s optimal choice, p*, will therefore depend on ttq, as stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 The leader’s equilibrium consultation effort p* is strictly positive and de­
pends on his level o f  overconfidence.
•  For 7To <  (1 +  2'kv )^~'^  : p* =  m in  ( ^ ( 1  -  l )
•  For (1 +  2'KV )^-  ^ <  7To <  (1 +  v^)'^ : p* =  m in  ^ ^ (1  -  +  l )
•  For (1 +  <  tto : p* =  m in  ^^(1 -  /3)p{l +  v^){l — ttttq), 1^
2.6 The implications of overconfidence
Having derived the equilibrium consultation decision and the equilibrium project choice, 
we now turn to the analysis o f the relative advantages o f appointing an overconfident leader.
2.6.1 Improved decision-making
Suppose that the leader’s consultation effort is fixed exogenously, say at p <  1. This 
would, for example, be the case if consultation of certain advisors is obligatory. Consider
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the leader’s use o f his private information. Efficiency would require that the leader chooses 
d =  S. This is because by doing so the leader maximizes the probability o f choosing the 
right project such that the worker’s effort is least likely to be wasted. If the leader could
commit to choose d =  S' it would be optimal for the worker to exert effort if and only if
C  <  ^irVd. Then expected total surplus would be
=  i /3 ( l  -  +  (1 -  p W ) { 1  -  V^) -
Lemma 2 has shown that a sufficiently realistic leader distorts his project choice with 
strictly positive probability in order to motivate the worker to exert effort. If the leader is 
sufficiently overoptimistic, however, he overestimates the benefits o f adopting the project 
that his signal points at, therefore choosing it efficiently. Proposition 3 formalises the ad­
vantages o f appointing an overconfident rather than a realistic leader for the organisation’s 
total surplus.
Proposition 3 For a constant level o f consultation, p  < 1 , consider the dependence o f  
total surplus on the leader’s level o f  overconfidence. Expected total surplus is
EnP = +  (1 -  P)fM)  -  i f
•  ^  ttq <  (1 +  27tu^)“  ^ then /(ttq) =  |  and total surplus is constant and strictly 
smaller than its efficient level.
.  I f  TToe [(1 +  2 ^ v r \ (1 +  then f M  =  
surplus is strictly increasing and smaller than its efficient level.
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•  ^  TTo >  (1  +   ^ then f{TTo) =  v^)  and total surplus is equal to its efficient
level.
In Figure 1 in Section 2.4 we have plotted the expected total surplus fi'om using the
leader’s private signal, against the leader’s level o f overconfidence. It can be seen
that the increase in total surplus is a result of a decrease in the leader’s likelihood o f distort­
ing his project choice in order to boost motivation. Higher decision-making efficiency is 
beneficial to the team, as it increases the probability o f adopting the productive project. It 
is also beneficial because it improves the worker’s ability to regulate his effort level accord­
ing to the productivity o f the team, thereby minimising the possibility that his effort will be 
wasted. Note that when ttq is higher than (1 +  g drops to zero, decision-making is
completely efficient, and total surplus ceases to increase in ttq.
2.6.2 Insufficient consultation
In this section we show that overconfident leaders devote very limited resources to seek 
external advice. To see this, note that while total surplus can be written as
E^P =  p E ^ [R  -  Ce)  +  (1 -  p)E^[R -  Ce) -
the leader chooses p  to maximize
E,„Pl = pE^ i^RO +  (1 -  -  ip^
Let p^ ^^  =  arg maXpe[o,i] E t^ P denote the efficient effort level and let p *{tto) =  
arg maXpg[o,i]-^ 7^ro-PL denote the leader’s optimal choice. There are two reasons why the 
leader’s choice is inefficiently low. The first reason is the familiar team production effect
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by which the leader fails to internalise the fact that the worker benefits when he obtains 
better information about X .  By comparing E t^ P with E t^qPl we can see that the leader 
focuses on R l rather than o n R  — Ce. The leader therefore neglects the worker’s share of 
revenue as well as his cost of implementing the project.
The second reason for p*(7To) <  is that an overconfident leader overestimates 
the expected revenue from using his private signal. Note that p* depends negatively on 
the relative advantage of finding clear evidence rather than having to rely on the imprecise 
private signal, E ^ R l — E^^Rl . It follows from Lemma 2 and Figure 1 that E^^{Rl ) is 
constant for ttq <  (H-27ru^)~^ and strictly increasing in the leader’s level o f overconfidence 
for 7To >  (1 +  27tu^)“ .^ Clearly, when the leader is more overconfident, he expects a higher 
revenue from using his private signal, and he chooses a lower p*. The following proposition 
summarizes these findings.
Proposition 4 The leader’s consultation effort is inefficiently low and weakly decreas­
ing in his level o f  overconfidence.
2.6.3 Can overconfidence improve efficiency?
In the previous sections, we have seen that overconfidence improves the use of a leader’s 
information but hinders its acquisition. In this section, we study the elements that determine 
the relative advantages o f appointing an overconfident rather than a realistic leader. The 
following proposition characterizes the leader’s level o f self-confidence which maximizes 
total expected surplus.
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Proposition 5 Whether overconfidence can improve efficiency depends on the leader’s 
cost o f  consultation 7 . ! / ' ) < ' ) *  then total surplus is maximized for a realistic leader 
(ttq =  tt). ^ 7  >  7 * then overconfidence improves efficiency. In this case total surplus is 
maximizedfor an overconfident leader with ttq =  ( 1  +  v^)~^ >  tt.
The optimal level o f confidence depends positively on 7 . When 7  increases, external 
consultation becomes more and more wasteful compared to the costless use o f the leader’s 
private signal. An overconfident leader with ttq >  (1 +  v^)~^ can use his private signal 
efficiently whereas a realistic leader makes inefficient project choices due to his strong 
motivational concerns. For sufficiently large 7 , total surplus is thus higher if  the leader is 
sufficiently overconfident.
For 7  >  7 * the optimal level of confidence ttq =  (1 +  v^)~^ is decreasing in v. When 
V is low, the worker’s motivation associated with different project choices differs strongly. 
It thus requires a high level of overconfidence to prevent the inefficiencies associated with 
the leader’s motivational concerns.
2.7 Robustness
The model outlined in Section 2.3 contains some assumptions that are necessary for our 
results, and others that only serve to simplify the argument. In this section we discuss these 
assumptions separately.
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2.7.1 Simplifying assumptions
In our model, we assume that the leader incurs the entire cost o f consulting externally. This 
is not necessarily the case in an organisation, and a more realistic scenario would assume 
that such cost is divided among the two agents. This would be the case, for example, if  
the consultation process took the form of a delay o f the project until better evidence is 
available and future payoffs are discounted. It is clear, however, that the argument that an 
overconfident leader underestimates the benefits o f consulting does not hinge on the exact 
share of the costs he incurs, as long as this share is strictly positive.
The assumption that consultation produces either perfect knowledge o f X  or no ev­
idence at all is also a simplifying assumption. The same holds for the assumption that the 
worker can perfectly observe whether consultation was successful or not. Relaxing these 
assumptions would considerably complicate the algebra. However, the conclusion that 
consultation increases the expected revenue o f the organisation would remain unchanged. 
Similarly, in our model the leader observes the value of the private signal only after he has 
chosen the level o f consultation. Alternatively, it could be assumed that he receives his sig­
nal before consultation takes place. In this case the level o f consultation would generally 
depend on his private information. His consultation effort could therefore serve as a signal 
of his type, that is whether he observed S  =  0 or S  =  1. However, both types of leaders, if  
they are overconfident, would engage in too little consultation effort. Similarly, as long as 
such signalling process does not reveal the leader’s type perfectly, he would still have the 
option to distort his project choice.
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The assumption that the implementation cost o f the worker is distributed uniformly 
greatly simplifies our calculations, as it causes the probability with which he exerts effort 
to increase linearly in his expectation o f the project’s productivity. Alternative assumptions 
about such relation would undoubtedly affect the incentives o f the leader to distort the 
project choice. Such incentive will be present, however, as long as the worker’s motivation 
is not independent o f his view on the team prospects.
Lastly, a comment on our interpretation of the concept o f “common knowledge”. We 
assume throughout the chapter that the only deviation from full rationality is the fact that 
the leader overestimates the precision o f his private signal. In particular, the worker knows 
the true precision, and the leader is aware o f this fact. Alternatively, we could assume 
that the leader also overestimates the worker’s perception o f his ability, or even that he is 
“charismatic”, and he manages to convince the worker that he is smarter than he actually 
is. These alternatives would clearly reinforce our result that overconfidence can serve as a 
counterweight to the temptation to improve the motivation o f subordinates.
2.7.2 Necessary assumptions
Our results depend critically on the assumption that different project choices induce differ­
ent levels o f motivation amongst subordinates. We have chosen to model such asymmetry 
as arising fi*om the difference between the projects’ payoffs conditional on success, \  — v. 
It is important to emphasise that such asymmetry could be caused by other reasons. One 
could assume, for instance, that v =  1, but that the information technology is not sym­
metric, with different precisions associated with different signals, P i{X  =  1 | 5  =  1) =
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7Ti >  7To =  Pr(X  =  0 I 5  =  0). In this case, the worker would be more motivated af­
ter observing d =  1 because he would expect that the leader is “more certain” about his 
choice than if  he observed d =  0. Assumptions 1 and 2, could be rewritten as ttq >  1/2 
and 7Ti (1 — 7To) >  7Tq respectively. Similarly, every result could be rewritten in terms o f this 
new asymmetry.
Another important assumption is the fact that the production process cannot be sold 
to the worker completely. If the leader’s payoff is independent o f the team’s revenue, 
then the leader would lose any incentive to motivate the worker with his project choice. 
There are different justifications for this assumption. The leader might receive a private, 
uncontractible, benefit when the project is successful. Alternatively, the worker may be 
subject to limited liability. In our model effort and the quality of the project choice are 
strategic complements, a frequent assumption in the economic literature. While the fact 
that the leader might distort his project choice in order to increase the motivation of the 
worker does not depend critically on this assumption, the direction o f such distortion does. 
If effort and project choice were strategic substitutes, the leader would be tempted to choose 
the least productive project, hence trying to portray a bleaker picture to the worker in the 
hope o f extracting higher effort from him.
2.8 Concluding comments
In the last two decades, the management literature on leadership has debated widely about 
how much impact CEOs have on their companies’ economic performance. On one side, 
traditional management theorists have argued that CEOs have significant impact, as they
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are able to shape their companies’ strategic direction. On the other side, organizational 
ecology researchers^ have claimed that CEOs are so constrained by their environments that 
they have little ability to affect company performance. In this chapter we have adopted the 
mixed view that leaders have the formal authority to choose the direction o f an organisation, 
but that the success of their choices depends partly on the motivation o f the workforce. As 
a result, leaders are implicitly constrained in their choices, and may prove irrelevant if  they 
are not confident enough about their own ability to guide the company in the right direction. 
Using this framework we have shown that the choice o f leaders is influenced by a trade­
off between the collection o f information and its use. The question o f whether efiiciency 
could be achieved simultaneously in both fields, however, remains. In practice, we observe 
that, while organisations often appoint leaders with strong self-confidence, they also strive 
to explicitly formalise the consultation process. Organisational teams, for instance, often 
have weekly meetings where their leader gets to hear, whether he likes it or not, about all the 
different opinions within the team. Similarly, political leaders are often obliged to consult 
parliamentary committees before reaching any decision. Because the decision-maker is 
himself the most interested in reaching the right decision, it is perhaps a bit puzzling why 
he is not left to decide in what circumstances alternative opinions would enrich the quality 
of his decisions. Using the framework of this chapter, however, this can be interpreted as 
an attempt to counterweight the drawbacks o f appointing an overconfident leader.
2.9 Appendix
 ^ See for example Hannan and Freeman [5]
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Proof o f Lemma 3 The first order condition o f the leader’s maximization problem reads
E ^ R l — E^^Rl — 2')p* >  0. The leader’s expected revenue from finding evidence is 
strictly larger than his expected revenue from using his private signal no matter his level 
o f overconfidence, E ^ R l >  E^^Rl - The leader’s optimal choice p* will therefore be 
strictly positive and the values o f p* are found by substituting E ^ R l and E^^Rl taken 
from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 respectively.
Proof of Proposition 3 Consider the leader’s use o f his private signal. Suppose that 
TTo <  (1 +  27tv^)~ .^ Lemma 2 has shown that in this case the leader will choose d =  1 no 
matter his signal. He will select the right project with probability Expected total surplus 
becomes
-  i^)(p(l + v )^ + (1 -  p)i) -  -yf <
If TTo >  (1 +  Lemma 2  has shown that the leader will choose d =  5 . He will therefore
select the right project with probability t t  and expected total surplus becomes
^ ^ ( 1  -  ^ /5)(p+ ( 1  -p)7T^)(l +  =  E^P^^^
Finally consider the intermediate case where (1 +  <  ttq <  (1 +  In this
case Lemma 2 predicts that the leader chooses project 1 if  S' =  1. However if 5  =  0 he 
randomizes, choosing project 1 with probability q and project 0 with probability 1 — g. It 
follows that if  d  =  0 the leader’s choice will be correct with probability t t .  If d  =  1 project 
1 is the right choice with probability . Expected total surplus in this case is
^ (^1 -  \ p )  (p(l + + (1 -  p)/(’To)) -
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where /(ttq) =  ( 1  -  q)n^v‘^ +  lü±2Üzz:)L_ Note that / ( ( I  +  2pv‘^ )~^) =   ^ and / ( ( I  +  
=  7T^ ( 1  +  which implies that expected total surplus is continuous in ttq. Substi­
tuting for q from Lemma 1 gives
r/ \ ^  7 tV ((1  -  TTpf +  u^ 7ro(7ro -  27t))
( tTo -  l)(7T 7ro(u 2  -  1 )  + 7 T o +  7 T -  1 )2
For the first derivative one gets
d f  _  7r^ U^ (27T -  l)(7r(l -  (1 -  U )^7To) +  27ro(7To -  1))
OtTq (tTo -  l)2 (7r7T o(u 2  -  1 )  + 7 T o  +  7T -  1 )2
The derivative is strictly positive if 7t(1 — (1 — v^)ttI) +  27To(7ro — 1) > 0 .  This last 
expression is minimized at ttq =  ( 2  — ( 1  — u^)7t)~^ where it takes the value .
It follows from Assumption 1 that this value is strictly positive as it is strictly increasing in 
7T and zero for tt =  (1 +  Thus expected total surplus is strictly increasing in ttq for
7To G [(1 +  27TU^)~\ (1 +
Proof of Proposition 4 As the worker exerts effort if  and only if his share o f the project’s
expected revenue is larger than C  it holds that E ^{C e) =  and E^{Ce) =
^^E^{R). It follows that
E ^ { R - C e ) - E ^ { R - C e )  =  ( 1 -^ ^ ) { E ^ { R )  -  E^{R))
>  (1 -  P)(E ^{R ) -  E^{R)) =  E ^ iR i,) -  >  0
The first order conditions thus imply that 0 <  p*{n) <  and that p*(7r) <  p^ ^^  if 
<  1. It follows from Lemma 1 that E ^{R ) — E^^{R) is strictly positive and weakly 
decreasing in ttq. This implies thatp*(7r) is weakly decreasing in ttq.
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Proof of Proposition 5 Using the leader’s equilibrium effort o f seeking advice p* from 
Lemma 3 and /(ttq) as defined in Proposition 3 the equilibrium level o f total surplus for a 
leader with overconfidence ttq is
E n P M  =  5 ^ (1  -  5 /9 )(p *(1  +  v^) +  (1 -  p * ) / ( x „ ) )  -  7(p*)2
Let 7f =  max{'K, (1+2pu^)~^). If ttq <  W, the leader will choose d =  1 no matter his signal
and E t^ P{'Kq) =  E-j^Piir) asp* and / ( . )  are constant. If ttq >  +  the leader chooses
d =  S  and it holds that Et,P{'Kq) <  E-j,P{r^^) as p* is non-increasing and /(ttq) =
7T^ ( 1  +  v^) <  (1 +  v^). We will now show that E t^ P{t[q) <  max
for any ttq such that tt <  ttq <  (1 +  In this range the leader chooses d =  1 with
probability q == G (0,1) after observing the signal 5  =  0. By inverting
the relationship between q and ttq we get
_  __________ 7T +  g ( l  -  tt)___________
7t ( 1  +  î ;2 )  +  ç ( l  —  TT +  7T7;2)
Substituting this expression into the formula for p* from Lemma 3 one finds
Moreover
1 +  g
so that we can write total surplus as a function o f q rather than ttq. A s ttq increases from 
7f to (1 +  q decreases from some g >  0 to 0. Let q* be the smallest q G [0,g] for 
which p* =  1. In the case that such a q* does not exist set q* =  q. As p* is non-increasing 
in 7To it follows thatp* =  1 for all g G [g*, g]. As evidence is found for sure it follows that 
total surplus is equal to (W) in We will now show that total surplus is a convex
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function o f ç for g G [0 , g*] which implies that E t^ P{'Kq) <  m ax
for all 7To such that tt <  ttq <  (1 +  For the second derivative o f total surplus with
respect to g we find
( ( 1  -  +  ( ! + « ' -  / ( g ) ) ÿ -  -
Substituting the derivatives and simplifying leads to
+  +  ^9 1 (9 ))
where
go{q) =  (4(1 — u^)7T^ — Stt +  4)g^ +  (2 — Gtt — 4u^(l +  7r^))g — 47 t^  +  Stt — 5 — 4u  ^
and
gi(g) =  2 (u^7t^  — (1 — 7r) )^g  ^+  (u (^27t  ^+  3) +  47t — l)g  +  (4 — 27t)(1 — tt) +
Note that gi(g) >  0 for all g G [0,1] as >  (1 — tt)  ^by Assumption 1. It follows that 
9o{q) +  ^9i{q) < 9o{q) +  9i{q) =  - 2 { v V  -  (l -  7r)^ )g^  -  (u2(l +  27t2) +  27t -  l)g  -  
— (1 — 27t(1 — 7t)) <  0 which implies that >  0.
Our argument so far implies that Et,P{'Kq) <  m ax (E t^ P{'k) ,E t^ P{y^ ) )  for all 
7To >  TT. It remains to compare the values of total surplus at these two points. Define 
7 =  J ( 1  — /5)(1 +  — 7t) and 7  =  |(1  — If the cost o f consultation is
sufficiently low, that is 7  < 7  then a leader with ttq =  ( 1  +  v^)~^ will choose p* =  1 such 
that
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If 7  > 7  then he will choose p* <  1 and
+ ^ ( 1  -  j3)(l +  -  7 t)  ({1 -  (2 -  +  v^) +  (1 -  j 3) t t )
Note that (1 -  (2 -  j3)7r^)(l +  v^) +  (1 -  /? )7t  >  (1 -  7r^)(l +  v^) >  0. is
continuous and decreasing in 7 . Consider the case where tt <  (1 +  2'ïïv^)~^. In this case a 
realistic leader chooses d =  1 for all S. If the cost o f consultation is such that 7  < 7  then a 
realistic leader will choose p* =  1 such that
£,P(7T) =  i ; 3 ( l - i ^ ) { l  +  ;^2 ) - 7
For 7  >  7  it holds that p* <  1 and one gets
S,P(7r) =  i ^ ( l  -  \ p )  +
ETrP{ir) is continuous and decreasing in 7 . For 7  < 7  it holds that Ej^PÇ-j^) =  E t^ P{'k). 
For 7 <  7  <  7 one finds that E t^ P{'k) -  E T ,P {r^ )  =  ^/ii(7 ) where
/i l(7 ) =  - 7  ^+  ^ ( 1  -  ^ ) ( 1  -  7T^ )(1 +
— ^ ( 1  -  ^)(1 +V ^ — 'k) ((1 -  (2 -  /?)7T )^(1 +  v^)  4- (1 -  P)v )
Note that /ii(.) is strictly concave and /ii(7 ) =  0. Also note that
^ ( 7) = f(l + + «“)) -  (1 -  /3)(1 + -  5t) j  > 0
For 7  >  7  one gets E ,P {v )  -  E , P { j ^ )  =  ^^2 (7 ) where
^2 (7 ) =  2^0- — 2 ^) f  2  ~  7  -
^ { 1  -  13) ^(1 +  t,2 -  n) ( { 1  -  ( 2  -  /9)7r^)(l +r;^) +  (1 -  ^)7t) -
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Note that ^  -  |/5(1 -  \^ )  (^ -  (1 +  v )^'k'^ ) <  -  \I5) <  0 and
^2 (7 ) =  ^1 (7 )- If ^ 2 (7 ) >  0 then let 7 * be defined by 7 2^ (7 *) =  0 , that is
. ^  /3(1 - P ) ( l  +  v^ -  7t)((1 -  (2 -  p)ir^){l +  v^) +  (1 -  ;8 )%) -  (I +
2 ( 2 - / 3 )  l - 2 ( l + t j 2 ) 7 r 2
Otherwise let 7 * be the largest solution to h i{Y )  — 0* H then follows that ET^P{n) <  
only if  7  >  7 *. The case where tt >  (1 +  27tu^)“  ^ is similar, the only
difference being that a realistic leader randomizes his project choice when S  =  0 such that
the expressions for E t^ P{'k) differ.
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Chapter 3 
Credibility and Cheap Talk of Securities 
Analysts: Theory and Evidence
“THERE are two theories about Wall Street’s role in the bubble years o f the new
economy. Either investment analysts were swept up, like everybody else Or Wall Street
saw a golden chance to peddle dirt... .New York’s attorney-general, Eliot Spitzer, is a pro­
moter o f the second theory. (He painted) Merrill Lynch’s share-buying recommendations 
. . .  as little more than a pretext to stuff gullible buyers with the shares o f rotten businesses... 
(Merrill) argues that the state-attomey misunderstands markets." The Economist [42].
3.1 Introduction
It is well known that securities analysts’ advice is optimistically biased*. However, the man­
ner in which such bias affects the transmission o f information from analysts to investors in 
the stock market is yet unclear. Two issues have been particularly disputed among regula­
tors and practitioners in the last years: whether analysts are deliberate in their optimism, 
and whether investors are able to understand this bias and anticipate it in their trading deci­
sions. These two issues have been at the core of a passionate public debate, an illustration 
of which is the quote at the beginning o f this chapter.
On one side o f this debate the New York attorney-general, Eliot Spitzer, among oth­
ers, has maintained that analysts are well aware o f the real state o f the companies they cover
® See, for instance, Boni and Womack [9].
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but that, being subjected to distorted incentives, they benefit fi’om propagating enthusiasm 
about these companies. Further, Spitzer’s argument continues, investors’ gullibility makes 
them take analysts’ advice at face value and be systematically misled by it. Consistently 
with his view, Spitzer has introduced regulatory reforms to adjust the incentives o f analysts 
and align them with the investors who they are supposed to serve.
On the other side, analysts’ employers, usually investment banks, have claimed that 
analysts report their private beliefs truthfully, although it is possible that some of them may 
suffer from "honest" (i.e. irrational) optimism about the companies they cover. Crucially, 
banks have stated that such "honest" bias is perfectly understood and anticipated by the 
average investor, hence making regulatory intervention unnecessary.
This chapter examines earnings forecasts, an important part o f analysts’ advice, and 
argues that none o f the above views accurately explain how forecasts are made by analysts 
and reacted to by investors. Alternatively, it claims that both analysts and investors are 
strategic in their behaviour (i.e. that analysts deliberately try to deceive investors and 
investors are aware o f this fact and heavily discount analysts’ advice).
To show this, I first study a model of information transmission between an (almost 
fully) strategic analyst who is privately informed about the earnings o f a company, and a 
strategic investor. In my model the analyst issues a forecast (i.e. a "message") that the 
investor must interpret and react to with an appropriate action. The analyst may be either 
’’honest”, in which case he truthfully reports his information, or ’’biased”, in which case 
he strategically raises his message to induce the investor into believing that the situation 
is better than he knows it to be. Crucially, the investor is uninformed about the type of
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the analyst, but she can use the message to update the likelihood that the analyst is biased 
rather than honest. Optimistic forecasts are assigned a lower probability o f mirroring the 
true information (i.e. they are not ’’credible”) and are strongly discounted.
In the most informative continuous equilibrium of this model the action o f the in­
vestor is an increasing and concave function o f the analyst’s message. Further, the slope 
of the action function is lower if  the investor has a higher prior suspicion that the analyst 
is a biased type. I show that these predictions do not arise under either o f the frameworks 
endorsed by Eliot Spitzer or the investment banks.
To test these predictions I use a large database o f company earnings, analysts fore­
casts and the stock market’s reaction to them. I first find that analysts are indeed biased, 
especially when they announce good news. For instance, when an average analyst an­
nounces an optimistic forecast o f 1 0  cents above the consensus, actual earnings are, on 
average, only 2 cents higher. However if the analyst announces bad news o f 10 cents be­
low the consensus, actual earnings are lower, on average, by 13 cents. Using parametric 
and nonparametric techniques I find that the function relating actual earnings and forecasts 
is concave, as predicted by the model.
I next show that the average investor understands this and reacts more to pessimistic 
forecasts than to optimistic ones. When an analyst announces good news o f 10 cents, the 
price on the shares o f the company increases, on average, by 0.15% on the day on which the 
announcement is made. However, if he reports a bad news o f 10 cents the price decreases 
by 0.7%, more than 5 times higher in magnitude. In my sample the standard deviation of
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the daily return is 3.6%, so 0.7% is an economically significant magnitude. I show that the 
function relating the stock market reaction to analysts forecasts is also a concave curve.
I then study the effect on investors’ reaction o f their prior suspicion that the analyst 
is a biased type. I conjecture that if  an analyst has predicted above actual earnings in most 
of his forecasts in the past, investors will consider him very likely to be an optimistically 
biased type. Indeed I find that when such analyst announces an optimistic forecast of 10 
cents, the share price does not increase. However if  the same forecast is announced by an 
analyst who has not issued highly optimistic forecasts in the past, the share price reacts by a 
magnitude o f 0.27%. Again this is consistent with my model and economically significant.
It is important to stress that these are the first empirical findings to provide support for 
a model o f strategic information transmission (i.e. cheap talk). Following Crawford and 
Sobel [14], an important theoretical literature has developed in the last two decades that 
studies the strategic communication between parties with conflicting interests. Unfortu­
nately, this interest has not been followed by a similar surge in studies testing its empirical 
implications. As a result very little is yet known about its predictive power. One major 
contribution o f this chapter is to combine a theoretical model in the Crawford and Sobel 
tradition with an empirical analysis that supports the intuitive predictions o f the model.
My findings also have direct policy implications. Although the average investor un­
derstands the bias in earnings forecasts, I show that information is communicated in a very 
ineflhcient way. In particular, optimistic news about the earnings o f a company are com­
pletely disregarded by investors and are not credibly communicated by analysts. Thus I 
conclude that analysts’ misalignment of incentives is preventing them from serving in­
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vestors appropriately, and regulatory reforms aimed at reducing it would have beneficial 
results for the financial industry.
Outline
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 discusses related work. 
Section 3.3 outlines the model, and Section 3.4 derives the theoretical results, which are re­
stated in the form of empirical predictions in Section 3.5. The data is presented in Section 
3.6 and the main empirical results in Section 3.7. Section 3.8 discriminates among alter­
native causes for analysts’ misaligned incentives. Section 3.9 briefly concludes. All the 
figures, tables and proofs are in the Appendix.
3.2 Related work
The concept o f credibility was first introduced in a cheap talk framework by Sobel [41], 
who analyses the incentives to build a reputation in a dynamic binary-state setting (see 
also Benabou and Laroque [7] and Fisher and Heinkel [17] for similar but richer models). 
More closely related to this chapter is Morgan and Stocken [36]. They study a continuous- 
state framework with two types o f strategic senders, biased and unbiased. In one o f their 
equilibria the reaction function is concave, with the action o f the receiver increasing one-to- 
one in the message if  this is pessimistic enough, and being completely flat if the message 
is too optimistic. The change in credibility is discrete: at a certain point the message 
shifts from being taken at face value to being (locally) ignored. Their equilibrium has, 
however, the undesirable feature that information can only be credibly transmitted in the 
set o f messages that the advisor would never use if he was a biased type. Such set is empty
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if the state space is unbounded, an assumption that is realistic in many real-life scenarios, 
including the study o f earnings per share that is the focus of my chapter. Contrary to 
Morgan and Stocken, I assume the unbiased sender to be non-strategic. In this setting, I 
find that information can be transmitted even if the state, message and action spaces are 
unbounded. In my model the strict concavity of the equilibrium reaction function is caused 
by the credibility o f a message decreasing continuously with the optimism embedded in 
it. Furthermore, I show that the slope o f the reaction function increases with the prior of 
sender’s honesty.
Ottaviani and Squintani [39] introduce a non-strategic receiver in a Crawford and So­
bel framework. They find an equilibrium where communication is inflated, information 
is not lost due to strategic reasons and the action is ex ante biased. This chapter comple­
ments their work by studying the case of a sender who may be non-strategic with some 
probability. However, my interest is in characterising the shape of the reaction function in 
equilibrium, an issue that Ottaviani and Squintani do not explore.
A large empirical literature has studied the recommendations and earnings’ fore­
casts of securities analysts^. Jackson [26] finds that analysts have an incentive to generate 
trade via optimistic forecasts, but are partly restrained by reputation concerns if investors 
can learn about their records. Michaely and Womack [35] show that, following an IPO, 
stocks recommended by affiliated analysts perform poorly in comparison to the ones rec­
ommended by unaffiliated analysts. They interpret this as evidence that underwriter ana­
lysts are positively biased in their recommendations. Malmedier and Shanthikumar [33]
® See, for instance, Chen and Jiang [12], Francis and Sofier [20], Keane and Runkle [28], Lim [31], Lin 
and McNichols [32], and Zitzewitz [45].
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build on Michaely and Womack by showing that small investors take recommendations at 
face value and do not discriminate among analysts. Large investors, on the other hand, are 
much less naive about analysts’ incentives. I study the behaviour o f the average investor 
(Badrinath and Wahal [6 ] show that large institutional investors account for the great ma­
jority o f volume traded) and I improve on the above mentioned studies on several grounds. 
By focusing on earnings forecasts (a continuous variable) rather than on stock recommen­
dations (a discrete variable), I am able to study the curvature o f the reaction function, and 
provide much sharper evidence o f the way in which investors discount analysts’ messages. 
Secondly, the use o f a theoretical model allows me to enrich the set o f testable predic­
tions and to consider alternative hypotheses about the rationality o f the agents. Lastly, my 
predicted variable (earnings) is not affected by the recommendation o f the analyst, and 
therefore my test does not suffer from the potential endogeneity problems present when the 
message (recommendation), if believed, can alter the state (share price) o f the world.
3.3 Credibility in a Cheap Talk Model
A representative investor (she) wants to learn about future earnings o f a company. At a 
given moment in time, the investor (and thus the market) holds an underlying consensus, c, 
about those future earnings and such consensus is incorporated in the price of the shares. 
The intention o f the investor is to react to news about the company earnings, buying when 
the news is favourable in relation to the consensus and selling otherwise.
Information Structure
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The investor has no independent means o f gathering information about the company, 
either due to limited attention (there may be many alternative investment opportunities to 
consider) or lack o f the expertise required to understand its accounts or strategy. A securi­
ties analyst (he) has those means. He uses them to collect information and, in conjunction 
with c, compute an optimal (private) guess, g, about future earnings. Define x =  g — cas  
the news above or below consensus arising from the private information o f the analyst. As­
sume that X is distributed normally with zero mean, x  ~  N {0, a^), where x e  X  =  31, and 
0 (.) and 0 (.) are the normal p.d.f and c.d.f respectively.
Preferences
The investor’s gain from learning x  arises from the opportunity to rebalance her in­
vestment portfolio due to the new information. Define a as the action o f buying (if a > 0) 
or selling (if a <  0) shares, where a E A =  %. With each piece o f news and action is as­
sociated a benefit, =  U^{a,x). I simplify the portfolio decision by assuming that the 
utility o f the investor reaches a unique maximum for =  x  and is:
U \a ,x )  =  —{a — x)^
This function can be interpreted as the utility loss suffered by the investor when she 
fails to adjust her portfolio eflftciently in the light of new existing information.
The central conflict o f the model arises because the preferences of the investor and 
the analyst may not be perfectly aligned. In particular, I assume that the analyst may prefer 
the investor to take a higher action than is optimal for her, a"^  =  x +  b > x  =  a ,^ where 
is the preferred action o f this type of analyst and 6  >  0  is the bias, or degree o f dissonance 
between the preferences o f both agents. Assume that q is the prior probability that the
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analyst is a biased type. There are different ways o f deriving such conflict o f interest from 
the preferences o f the analyst. I follow Morgan and Stocken [36] and assume that the 
objective function o f the biased analyst consists o f two elements: a benefit associated with 
inflating the investor’s action and a cost associated with poor performance caused by the 
distortion o f the information revealed to the investor.
Æ, b) =  2ba — {a — x)^
I also assume that, with probability 1 — g, the analyst is honest and non-strategic and 
reports his information truthfully. This assumption is also used by Ottaviani and Squin­
tani [39] and by Benabou and Laroque [7]. The justifications for this assumption can be 
behavioural (an analyst adhering to a code o f ethics by which distorting information is con­
sidered immoral) or in terms o f payoff uncertainty. In reality, an analyst who misrepresents 
his private information runs some risk o f being discovered and fined huge penalties. For in­
stance, when Henry Blodget, a Merrill Lynch star analyst, was discovered to hold different 
views in his private e-mails from the ones that he maintained in public, he was fined $4m 
and barred from the securities industry for life‘°. The assumption o f non-strategic honesty 
could therefore apply to analysts who are very risk averse or who estimate the chances of 
being caught lying as very high. I believe, however, that assuming that the analyst is strate­
gic but cares about being perceived as unbiased would not qualitatively alter the theoretical 
results.
Henry Blodget ’’described the shares of excite@home, which he publicly rated as a short-term accumulate 
and long-term buy, as “such a piece of crap”. Of InfoSpace, both a short- and a long-term buy, he claimed 
in private emails that the “stock is a powder keg”” The Economist [42]. In a similar scandal, another star 
analyst employed by Citigroup was fined $15m and also barred from the industry.
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Information Transmission and Beliefs
The investor has no means of inducing truthful revelation through a contract. The 
analyst can, however, issue a message m, with m E M  =  3%, to influence the investor’s 
expectation o f x. The message takes the form of a forecast /  about earnings, where m  =  
/  “  c.
If the analyst is honest, he truthfully announces m  =  x. For the biased analyst, a 
strategy consists o f a family of functions {v  (• | where, for each x, v {-  \ x) is a
p.d.f. on the message space M , and | x)dm  =  1. If the analyst follows a pure
strategy over some range o f the state space, then v {-  | x) is degenerate in this range and is 
represented by the function fi : x m.
After observing m, the investor updates her expectation about x. Define (/?(• | 
as the family o f functions that compose the investor’s beliefs o f x. For each m, 
/3(- I m) is a p.d.f on the state space X  and j3(x | m )dx =  1.
Timing
The timing is as follows: (i) The analyst learns his type, honest or biased (ii) The 
analyst learns x and issues a message m  (in) The investor observes m, updates her beliefs 
and adopts an action a (iv) The payoffs of both agents are realised.
Equilibrium concept
The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equlibria (FEE). An equilibrium con­
sists o f reaction function, a(m), a family of message functions, (v (• | x))xesi and a family
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of belief functions (/5 (• | such that
a e  arg max J  U \a^x)j5 {x | m) dx (3,3)
%
l f v { m \  x) >  0, then m  G arg max U'^{a{m), x, b) (3.4)
qv(m\x)(i>(x)
{l-q )4> im )+q  J V  {iTl \ x) (f) (x) dx
i f  X
^ { x \ m )  =  <
%
(l-q)(l>(m)+qv(rn\x)4>(x)
(3.5)
i f  m  =  X  
(l-g)<^(m )+g / V  (iTl \ x) (j) (x) dxJ  v { m \ f
%
3.4 Analysis
Communication games usually have many equilibria, and this game is no exception. I focus 
on the most responsive continuous equilibrium and derive a number o f predictions about it. 
Section 3.7 shows that the transmission of information in the real world is consistent with 
and only with the predictions o f the most responsive continuous equilibrium.
Define {x) as the function that maps states observed by analyst type i into actions 
under equilibrium j .  Similarly define a^  (m) as the reaction function under equilibrium j .
Definitionl A continuous equilibrium is an equilibrium where the functions A\ (x) are 
continuous. Consider two continuous equilibria, J  and K , and assume that Af {x)  and 
A f ( x )  are strictly increasing in X f  Ç R and X f  Ç R  respectively Then,
1. Equilibrium J  is more responsive than equilibrium K  if  X f  C X f  VI
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2. Equilibrium J  is the most responsive continuous equilibrium if  every other continuous 
equilibrium k has a corresponding such that C X /  Vi
3. Equilibrium J  is fully-responsive i f  X f  =  X  =  R ^ i.
Intuitively, in a continuous equilibrium the action does not "jump around" when the 
state o f the world is slightly higher or lower. In a very responsive equilibrium a lot of 
information is being credibly transmitted by the analyst (i.e. the investor is responding to 
higher messages by taking higher actions). The rest o f this Section shows that in the most 
responsive continuous equilibrium the reaction function of the investor is concave and has 
a lower slope when q is higher.
3.4.1 The reaction of the investor
From Section 3.3, an equilibrium is a combination o f strategies and beliefs that satisfies 
(3.3), (3.4), and (3.5). In the following Lemma, I combine (3.3) and (3.5) to study the 
equilibrium reaction function.
Lemma 4 In any equilibrium o f  this game the reaction o f  an investor to a message mf 
is given by:
_  ( 1  -  q)m'<p{m') +  q j^ x v  (m' | x) ÿ  ( i )  dx
{ l -q)4>i m' )  +  q f ^ v { m ' \ x ) ^ { x ) d x
I f  m! is issued using a pure strategy //(•), the reaction o f  the investor is given by:
„ ^ F W \  rr,'] =
* 1  ' ( l - 9 ) 0 ( m ' ) + g 0 ( / * - H m ' ) )
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Lemma 4 illustrates the concept of the "credibility" o f a message. Consider, for 
instance, the intuition o f (3.7). The investor is uncertain about two things; the infor­
mation o f the analyst, x, and his type, ’’honest” or ’’biased”. If the investor knew with 
certainty that the analyst issuing mf is honest, her optimal action would be a =  m'. 
Conversely, if she knew that the analyst is a biased type, it would be optimal for her to 
make a =  The weight that the investor gives to m! (’’following literally”) over
/z“^(m') (’’undoing the bias”) can therefore be regarded as the credibility that she gives to 
the message. (3.7) states that this credibility is equal to the Bayesian posterior probabil­
ity o f the message having been created by an honest analyst, Pr[i/onesi | m =  m'] =  
[(1 — q)(j){'m!)] /  [(1 — q)(f>(m') +  q(f) (/i“^(m'))]. It is easy to see that this probability de­
pends negatively on q, and positively on [< (^m')/(  ^(//~^(m'))], the relative chances that a 
normal distribution produced m! rather than
3.4.2 The analyst’s problem
I now turn to the equilibrium behaviour of the analyst. When the honest analyst observes 
x', he issues, by assumption, a truthful message m =  x'. The biased analyst maximises his 
payoff by solving the following problem:
M ax 2ba — {a — x'Ÿm
s.t. a =  E[x  I m] as given by (3.6)
After rearranging, the first order condition of this problem can be written as:
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(E[x \ m ] - x ' -  =  0 (3.8)
Any equilibrium of this game must therefore meet conditions (3.6) and (3.8). (3.8) 
shows that, if  the investor’s action increases continuously with the message > 0 ),
in equilibrium the biased analyst must be reaching his bliss point (E[x | m] =  x' -\-b =  
a^). By assumption, altering the message has no direct cost per se (talk is ’’cheap”, or 
more precisely, ’’free”), so this condition is quite intuitive. Clearly, if  E[x  | m] increases 
continuously with m, and raising m has zero cost for the biased analyst, he will always be 
able to exaggerate infinitely and induce his optimum a^.
3.4.3 Fully-responsive equilibria
Before characterising the most responsive continuous equilibrium, I show that a fully- 
responsive equilibrium does not exist in this game.
Proposition 6  A fully-responsive equilibrium does not exist.
Definition 1 states that in a fully-responsive equilibrium the investor always takes 
higher actions when the information o f the analyst is higher, regardless o f whether he is an 
honest or a biased type. The honest analyst makes m  =  x, so he cannot induce different 
actions under different states o f the world if dE[x  | m ] / d m =  0 holds in some interval of 
the message space. Therefore a fully-responsive equilibrium can only exist if the implicit 
function of m on x, given by E[x | m] —x —b =  0, is defined over the entire state space. The
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proof o f Proposition 6  shows that this is impossible. The reason is that, for a suflhciently 
high value o f x, a value o f m  that meets E[x \m] — x — b =  0 cannot be found.
To understand the intuition, imagine that the message is sent using a pure strategy 
//(•). Using the fact that, in equilibrium, =  x, E[x  | m] — a: — 6  =  0 can be
rewritten as:
F K . )  -  ™ - 1, ( l  + -  » <’ ■">)
(3.10) shows that a fully-responsive equilibrium requires the message to be always 
higher than the state x  by an amount at least equal to b. Moreover, when x  is higher the 
credibility o f the corresponding message is lower (note that -^[<l){x)/ <p{x +  0 ] >  0  if 
 ^ >  0) and the ’’wedge” between m and x has to be higher to meet condition (3.10). The 
proof o f Proposition 6  shows that, when x  is veiy high, credibility is so low that it becomes 
impossible to find a message that will induce a =  x +  b from the investor.
3.4.4 The most responsive equilibrium
After ruling out fully-responsive equilibria, I characterise the continuous equilibrium where 
more information is transmitted to the investor.
Proposition 7 I f it exists, the most responsive continuous equilibrium meets the follow­
ing conditions:
1. A cutoff value, x* divides the state space in two sections; a cutoff value, m* divides the 
message space in two sections, and m* is a solution to the equation F{m,x*)  =  0.
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2. I f  the biased analyst observes x <  x*, he issues a message (in pure strategies) using a 
function m  =  p^ ^{x) with the following properties:
(a) ^ > 0
(b) ^ > 0  
W  ^ > 0
3. I f  the investor observes m  <  m*, she chooses her action using an action function, 
a^^{m ) with the following properties:
W ^ > 0  
(b) ^ < 0
w  ^ < 0
4. I f  the investor observes m  >  m*, she always chooses the same action a*, which is 
determined by the equation:
(1 -  ç)(l -  $ (m*)) + ç(l — $ (x*))
5. I f  the biased analyst observes a value x >  x*, he chooses his message (in mixed
strategies) using a family offunctions (• | x))x>x* so as to make, Vm >  m*:
(1 -  q) ttkI) (m) +  q x v^ ^  {m\x)( f )  (x) dx  ^  ,
(1 — ç) (m) +  q { m\  x)(j) (x) dx
6 . I f  the biased analyst observes x*, he is indifferent between issuing a message in the
responsive or the non-responsive parts o f  the equilibrium.
(1 -  q)<p{m*)m* +  q4>(x*)x*
(1 -  9)0(m*) +  # (x * )   ^ ^
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Proposition 7 is the main theoretical result of the chapter. It states that, under the most 
responsive continuous equilibrium of this game, the reaction function is concave when the 
message is below certain value and flat if  the message is too optimistic (see Figure C). 
Furthermore, in this equilibrium the slope o f the reaction function is lower when the ex 
ante probability o f the analyst being a biased type is higher (see Figure D). These are the 
predictions that will be tested in the empirical analysis below.
Intuition o f  the equilibrium
To understand intuitively this equilibrium consider first the convexity o f the message 
function in the responsive part (see Figure A). The message function when x <  x* has to 
satisfy (3.10). If x  is higher, the analyst has to issue a higher message if  he is to induce an 
inflated action from the investor. In fact, he has to make m higher by a larger amount than 
the increase in x, to compensate for the loss of credibility (as argued in Subsection 3.4.3) 
when he conveys more optimism in his message. Therefore when x  is higher, m  and x  are, 
in equilibrium, further apart.
But how does the slope o f the message function, //^^(a:), depend on x l  If x in­
creases from an already high position, the analyst is more affected by subsequent losses of 
credibility (i.e. a decrease of [q(j) (x) /  {1  — q)(f) (m)] reduces the action by more because 
m and x are further apart). Therefore, as x increases, the analyst has to exaggerate increas­
ingly more to maintain a ’’wedge” between the investor’s optimal average o f x  and m  and 
his information x. Hence, the convexity of the message function.
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Consider now the concavity o f the reaction function in the responsive part of the 
equilibrium. Remember that the reaction function is the inverse o f the message function 
=  X b =  +  b). The strict concavity in the responsive part (see Figure
C when m  <  m*) is the inverse o f the strict convexity o f the message function. Because 
the biased analyst exaggerates increasingly as x becomes higher, the investor discounts in­
creasingly as the message becomes more optimistic. In other words, because the analyst 
anticipates that optimistic messages are less credible, the more favourable his private in­
formation is, the more he inflates them. By doing this he only strengthens the investor’s 
presumption that she should heavily discount optimistic messages. In equilibrium the mes­
sage of a biased analyst increases with his private information in a convex way, and its 
converse (i.e. the reaction o f the investor) increases with the message only in a concave 
way.
The same intuition holds for the cross-derivatives o f the message and the reaction 
function. When q is higher, the weight that the investor assigns to the analyst telling the 
truth becomes lower, as can be seen in (3.10). Thus m  and x  have to be further apart, at 
any state of x, if  q is higher. That makes the analyst more seriously affected by the loss of 
credibility, and more prone to exaggeration, when x  is higher. The message function has 
therefore a higher slope if  the exogenous parameter q is higher (see Figure B). Conversely, 
the action function has a lower slope in its responsive part (see Figure D) if q is higher, as 
higher strategic optimism by an analyst with a higher q is matched by stronger discounting 
of the messages produced by such analyst. In other words, because investors associate 
optimistic forecasts relatively more with his presumed exaggeration and relatively less with
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the truth, an analyst more suspected to be biased is forced to exaggerate more if  he wishes 
to inflate the investor’s action. This fact is anticipated by the investor, reinforcing his 
disposition to react less to better news when those are conveyed by a highly suspected 
analyst.
Consider now the logic of the non-responsive section o f the equilibrium. In this sec­
tion, all messages are treated equally and the action is the average o f the possible states 
in which an analyst would issue a message above m*. Part 4 o f Proposition 7 comes sim­
ply from rearranging this condition. I do not explicitly characterise the family o f message 
functions in the non-responsive section. This does not imply a loss o f predictions because 
empirically I only observe in the sample E[x\rini\ and m, but not x. It is therefore not 
possible to test any predictions on the message function and my empirical efforts will be 
directed to the estimation of the action function. A valid message function, however, must 
leave the investor completely uninformed about where the state o f the world lies (obvi­
ously, the investor knows that x lies in the interval (x*, oo), but not where in the interval). 
Because the honest analyst always reports the truth, the combined message can only be un­
informative if  the biased analyst ’’hides” this information by adopting a message function 
that makes the expected state, conditional on the message, always equal to a*. Equation 
(3.12) displays this condition. Lastly, Part 6  states that the action function must be contin­
uous at the intersection between the responsive and the non-responsive section.
Other equilibria
There are two other continuous equilibria in this game and I describe them in the 
proof o f Proposition 7 (see Appendix). One of them is the standard non-responsive equi­
3.4 Analysis 81
librium, displayed in Figure E. In this equilibrium, the message o f the analyst is completely 
uninformative, and the action of the investor coincides with the unconditional expectation 
of X.  The other equilibrium is identical to the most responsive equilibrium o f Proposition 7 
except for a ’’flat” section in the left tail of the message space (see Figure F). It is immediate 
to conclude that both equilibria are less responsive than the one described in Proposition 7.
3.4.5 Existence
The most responsive equilibrium does not exist for every possible set o f the exogenous 
parameter values (b, q, There are two reasons for this. Firstly, the system of equations
(3.11) and (3.13), which together determine the point {x*,m*),  may not have a solution. 
Proposition 6  states that (3.10), and therefore (3.13), are not defined for every possible 
value o f X.  As a result the intersection with the curve (3.11) is not guaranteed, and an 
equilibrium may not exist.
The second reason relates to the family of message functions in the flat section of 
the state space. Observe the left hand side of condition (3.12). The honest analyst, who is 
part o f the game with probability ( 1  — ç), issues messages in this section o f the equilibrium 
with a probability [1 — $(m*)]. Such messages have to be uninformative to the investor 
(i.e. they must be hidden) for the equilibrium to exist. This is only possible if  the biased 
analyst, who exists with probability g, issues the appropriate message when he observes 
a state higher than x*. As q tends to 0, (3.12) cannot hold for every message m  >  m*. 
1 posit that a suflficient condition for the existence o f a family o f functions v { m \  x)  that 
make (3.12) hold is that a state observed by a biased analyst occurs at least as often as a
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state observed by an honest analyst ((1 — ç) [1 — ^(m*)] <  g [1 — 0  (x*)]). The conjecture 
below summarises this discussion.
Supposition 1 The most responsive equilibrium exists if  the exogenous parameters 
{b, q, <7^} are contained in the set {[2,3], [0.2,0.9], [0.5,1.5]}
In the above conjecture, I have used numerical methods to calculate the set o f param­
eters for which (3.11) and (3.13) have a solution and (1 — q)[ l  — 0(m*)] <  g [1 — 0  (x*)] 
is satisfied.
I accept the absence o f analytical conditions for the most responsive equilibrium to 
exist as a drawback o f this model. However, it is important to emphasize that my intention 
is not to develop a general theory of credibility and cheap talk, but to provide an example of 
a possible equilibrium characterised by a number of intuitive predictions that can compared 
with the empirical evidence. It is this task that I undertake in the following sections.
3.5 Empirical Tests
The two main predictions o f the model can be observed in Figure C and Figure D: the 
action function is concave and it has a lower slope if  there is a greater prior  suspicion that 
the analyst is a biased type.
< O a n d Æ < 0
dm? dm dq
In the model a =  E[x \m],  so this is equivalent to:
d ‘^ E[x I m] d'^E[x | m]
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I use two complementary strategies to estimate the reaction function empirically. 
Consider first the relation between E[x | m] and m. In the sample I observe an analyst’s 
forecast ( /) ,  the consensus (c) and hence the message (m  =  /  — c), but not his private infor­
mation (x =  p — c) . It is impossible to know whether a particular analyst has deliberately 
raised his forecast, as x  and m  cannot be directly compared. By using actual earnings per 
share (e) I can, however, study statistically whether analysts are likely to be strategically 
raising their forecasts. The difference between actual earnings and the consensus at a par­
ticular moment in time is, by definition, an unbiased expectation o f the private information 
held by an analyst at that moment: (e — c) =  E[g] — c =  E[x].  The theoretical relation 
between E  [x] and m  can be captured empirically by the relation between actual earnings 
and forecasts.
E  [x] =  (e -  c) =  (fi{f - c ,  q ) -he  (3.14)
If all analysts report their information truthfully (rn =  x ) l  will find" that =  1, 
=  0 and =  0. By contrast, a finding that | ^  <  1, ^  <  0 and
dif-c)dq ^  0  would support the theoretical model.
I proxy q for a particular analyst at moment t  by the percentage o f times that this 
analyst has forecasted above the actual value ( ( / —c) — (e—c) >  0 ) in the periods previous to 
t. Under the null hypothesis of truthtelling, an analyst incurs a high percentage of optimistic 
errors only by chance and a high value o f the proxy for q is uninformative about his present 
message strategy. In my model, however, past optimistic errors are indicative of the analyst 
being a biased type and informative about his present behaviour.
These predictions also hold even if the analyst is not perfectly informed about actual earnings, although 
in such case the goodness of fit of any estimation will be lower.
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Equation (3.14) relates forecasts and optimal expectations o f earnings as constructed 
by the econometrician. However, it does not indicate whether real investors behave in 
a manner consistent with the theoretical modeP^. To examine this, I study the change 
in the price o f the shares of a company around the date on which a forecast was made 
r — { AP / P) .  The shares of a company increase (decrease) in price when good (bad) news 
about its earnings are believed by investors. I therefore study:
r =  Tr{f - c ,  q)-\-T] (3.15)
If all analysts are truthful in their forecasts (and investors know it), I will find =
0 and =  0. By contrast the finding that <  0 and <  0 would support
the theoretical model.
3.5.1 Cognitive biases and Naive Investors
It is important to stress that the assumption of strategic behaviour for both the biased analyst 
and the investor is essential for the predictions o f the theoretical model in Section 3.3. To 
emphasise this, I analise in this subsection the predictions o f models where the analyst 
suffers from ’’behavioural optimism” or where the average investor is "naive".
Khaneman and Lovallo [27] have suggested that some analysts view the companies 
that they are covering in a unique narrow frame (the same way as parents view their children 
as better than their neighbours’). They are unable to accept the fact that their companies
The fact that the action equals the ex post expected state of the world is not a general result, but a direct 
consequence of using a quadratic loss function centred around x. In the real world, there are many reasons 
why a and JE^[rc | m] differ. For example the investor may face non-linear transaction costs, or his valuation 
of the shares of the company may not increase linearly with its earnings. For this reason it is important to 
study the actions of investors separately.
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may do badly, and therefore experience optimistic cognitive biases on them. There are 
different ways to study the action function under what Khanneman and Lovallo term ’’the 
insider’s view”. In my framework, it could be assumed that all analysts suffer from a 
cognitive bias h on the company that they follow. In this case the optimal action o f investors 
would be to just subtract b from the message, a =  m  — b (see Figure G).
Alternatively, it could be assumed that some analysts are unbiased (m =  x) whereas 
others suffer from cognitive, honest, bias (m =  x +  b) and that the type o f the analyst 
is unknown to the investor. Such model would be equivalent to the model in Section 3.3 
with the exception that the biased analyst would be non-strategic. It is easy to see that the 
optimal reaction o f an investor to a message m in this case would be:
a =  E [ x \ m ] ^ ^ ^-  (3.16)
(1  -  q)(j){m) +  (m -  b)
The plot o f (3.16) (see Figure H) shows that the action function is concave along some 
range and then convex. The reason is that a non-strategic analyst does not anticipate the 
investor’s discounting o f more optimistic messages and therefore does not raise his forecast 
more when he observes a higher a;. As a result, a rational investor never discounts from the 
message a magnitude higher than b. When the message is very optimistic, an amount very 
close to b has already been discounted, and the slope o f the reaction function is therefore 
close to one.
Consider now the predictions o f a model where the analyst is strategic in his biased 
behaviour, and the investor is "naive". Note that in this case the action o f the investor and 
the econometrician’s optimal estimate of earnings do not coincide (a ^  E[x  | m]). As 
Figure I shows, a naive investor takes the message at face value (a =  m). In such case it
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suffices for a biased analyst to add a constant bias to his message to reach his bliss point. 
Consequently, the optimal estimate o f earnings has the same shape as in the case o f the 
possibly biased non-rational analyst. I display this case in Figure J.
3.6 Data
Quarterly earnings per share forecasts and earnings are taken from the I/B/E/S Detail 
Database* .^ In order to reduce heteroskedasticity, I eliminate forecasts for firms with share 
prices below $5 or market capitalisations below $100 million (both in 2002 CPI-deflated 
dollars) and I scale forecasts and earnings by the stock price 10 days before the forecast 
date. I further trim the 1% extreme values o f the test variables to avoid concerns that the 
results are driven by outliers. The results are not, however, sensitive to the choice o f outlier 
rule.
The unit o f analysis is an analyst-firm pair. The reason for this is that an analyst may 
be biased with respect to one firm but not with respect to another. In the future I will often 
use the term ’’analyst” for an analyst-firm pair whenever no confusion is caused.
When conducting an event study it is important to establish with some accuracy the 
date on which a forecast was made. I/B/E/S has reported this date with increasing precision 
overtime, with a big improvement occurring at the beginning o f the nineties, when the data-
I/B/E/S has several advantages with respect to other databases. It is free of survivorship bias and (unlike 
Zacks) it comprises the great majority o f public forecasts. Furthermore, unlike actuals from others sources 
like COMPUSTAT, I/B/E/S actual earnings are recorded on the same basis as I/B/E/S forecasts. According to 
Abarbanell and Lehavy [2] significant changes were made in the period 1989-1991 and in 1995 to systemat­
ically redefine reported earnings in order to improve its quality. Although I include in my sample some years 
previous to the 1995, all the empirical results remain unchanged when the sample is restricted to the period 
1996-2002,
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entering system was switched from manual into electronic. From 1992 almost all analyst 
enter their forecasts directly into the system, usually within 24 hours o f providing them to 
clients. For this reason I limit the sample to the period 1993-2001.
I compute the consensus c as the average o f all forecasts made on the last day on 
which a forecast occurred. Because forecasts on a specific day incorporate information 
contained in previous forecasts, I believe that this measure represents the best possible 
estimation o f the prevailing consensus. However the results remain unchanged even when 
alternative measures are used, like the average of the last three forecasts or a weighted 
average o f all prevailing forecasts. The test variables are E arnings =  E A R N I N G S  — 
C O N S E N S U S  =  ( e - c )  and Forecast =  F O R E C A S T - C O N S E N S U S  =  { f - c ) .  
Henceforth in the chapter I will refer to earnings and forecasts as the variables net o f the 
consensus, and to gross earnings and gross forecast as the variables before the consensus is 
subtracted.
I compute a proxy for q using the past information on the analyst-firm pair. I first 
construct a variable d that equals 1 if a forecast is above actual earnings and 0  if it is equal 
to or below actual earnings. For every analyst-firm pair forecast, I compute a weighted 
average o f d from its first forecast to the forecast s — 1 . 1 use an inverse-weighting scheme 
to assign higher weights to more recent forecasts. If a forecast I has been issued hi quar­
ters before forecast s, the inverse weighting assigns weight lji =  { l /hi )  (X Iü(V ^ fc))to  
the value di and the proxy for q becomes P rior is =  The inverse-weighting
scheme accounts for two possible effects: a recency effect (investors remember better more
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recent forecast errors) and changing bias over time (more recent forecasts are more indica­
tive o f the existence o f a bias in the present than forecasts in the distant past).
Lastly, I use CRSP data to assign a market reaction to every forecast. I compute 
investor’s reaction as the abnormal return (i.e. the firm’s raw return less the value-weighted 
market return) on the shares of the company on which a forecast was made, around the 
forecast date (all the main results remain unchanged when I use a two-day or a three-day 
window around the forecast date). Returnu =  , where P  is the
share price o f the company and M P  is the value-weighted average price o f the market.
The sample I use contains 1,178,425 forecasts, covering 7,274 analysts, 7,236 firms 
and 526 brokerage houses over a period o f 10 years. The number o f firm-analyst pairs is 
105,698 and the number of firm-quarter combinations is 110,137. Table 1 reports summary 
statistics for the major variables used in the empirical analysis.
3.7 Results
3.7.1 Nonparametric results
In this section I do not impose any parametric form on the estimation o f the conditional 
means of earnings and returns:
Earning Sit =  ^[Forecast a, P rio r  a) +  £u (3.17)
Returnu  =  n{Forecasta, P riora) +  rjn (3.18)
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Pooled Regressions
I pool initially all analysts together. Figures K and L display the estimated relation 
between earnings, returns and forecasts. I use a nonparametric regression with a normal 
kernel, optimal bandwidth and 50 grid points. Both figures show that the estimated curves 
are concave and therefore support the predictions of the theoretical model. They also reject 
the predictions o f models based on alternative assumptions about the rationality o f the 
agents. Figure K also casts doubts over empirical efforts, common in the literature, based 
on the assumption that the relationship between earnings and forecasts is linear (see, for 
example, Zitzewitz [45]).
I interpret the concavity o f the earnings function as evidence that analysts are pos­
itively biased, specially when they make optimistic forecasts. I interpret Figure L as evi­
dence that investors are aware o f this fact, and regard optimistic (but not pessimistic) fore­
casts with scepticism.
Given the big sample size, the confidence intervals are very close to the estimated 
conditional means, specially for the (less noisy) earnings function.
Note lastly that the slope o f the earnings function is slightly higher than 1 for pes­
simistic forecasts, a finding that is not consistent with the theoretical predictions. Although 
this is a potentially interesting question, I believe that it does not invalidate the relevance 
of the model.
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In order to understand the economic magnitude of my empirical findings, consider 
the example o f a firm with a share price of $40 and an underlying consensus about earnings 
in the following quarter o f 40 cents per share. Assume that an average analyst makes a 
forecast o f 0. Figure K shows that the optimal expectation o f earnings is slightly below 0; 
I find from the output of the nonparametric estimation that expected earnings are in fact, 
-0.7 cents (the optimal expectation of gross earnings is therefore 39.3 cents per share).
Assume now that the analyst makes a forecast o f 10 cents, a very optimistic forecast 
(a forecast o f 10 cents is approximately in the 90th percentile o f the forecast distribution). 
1 find that expected earnings conditional on such forecast are 1.3 cents, that is, only 2 cents 
higher than if  the forecast is 0 .
Would a pessimistic forecast of equal magnitude have a similar absolute effect on 
expected earnings? Figure K shows that it would not. Quantitatively, expected earnings 
conditional on a forecast o f -10 are -13.6 cents. 1 conclude that the magnitudes are signifi­
cant: expected earnings change 6.5 times more if  a forecast o f 10 cents, in absolute value, 
is optimistic rather than pessimistic.
More importantly, do investors react differently to optimistic and pessimistic fore­
casts? The concavity o f the curve in Figure L shows that they do. The standard deviation 
o f the daily return in the sample is 3.6%. Using the results of the nonparametric regression 
1 find that the price o f the shares o f a company increases by only 0.15% when an analyst 
makes an optimistic forecast o f 10 cents on a certain day. However, they decrease by an 
average o f 0.7%, (a magnitude more than 5 times higher, and around 20% of the daily re­
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turn standard deviation) if the forecast is o f the same absolute value but negative sign. The 
magnitudes are also economically significant.
Regressions by different values of P rior
In this subsection I study the effect o f the prior probability that the analyst is biased 
on the shape o f the earnings and return functions. To achieve this, I rank the observations in 
the sample according to the variable P rior  and split the sample into five quintiles. Higher 
(lower) quintiles refer to analysts that have predicted very often above (below) actual earn­
ings.
I run nonparametric regressions separately for each quintile and plot them together 
in Figures M and N. Figure M shows that optimistic forecasts imply higher earnings only 
if  they are announced by an analyst who has not predicted too optimistically in the past. 
Indeed the estimated functions for the first two quintiles are reasonably linear and close 
to the 45-degree line. On the other hand, optimistic forecasts announced by analysts with 
high values of P rior  are strongly biased and not related to higher earnings. The bias is 
however much lower when such analysts make pessimistic forecasts. Indeed I find that the 
conditional mean functions for the three higher quintiles are strongly concave curves.
Figure N  displays the reaction of investors to the announcements made by different 
types of analysts. Importantly, investors react equally to any pessimistic forecast, regard­
less of who made it (note that the curves for different quintiles intersect if the news are 
pessimistic). However, investors react to an optimistic forecast by driving the price of the 
shares up only if  that forecast is made by an analyst in a low quintile.
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The difference in the reaction to optimistic news announced by different analysts is 
also economically significant. Assume for instance that a forecast o f 10 cents is announced 
by an analyst in the first quintile. Using the output o f the nonparametric estimations I find 
that expected earnings are 6 . 8  cents higher, and the share price increases by 0.27% (almost 
twice the reaction to an average analyst, and 7.5% of the daily return standard deviation). 
However, if the analyst announcing a forecast o f 10 cents belongs to the highest quintile, 
expected earnings are actually lower (by 2  cents) and the share price changes by just 0 .0 2 % 
on average.
3.7.2 Parametric Results
In this section I complement the results above with the estimation o f parametric nonlinear 
versions of (3.17) and (3.18). This allows me to introduce controls on the estimation and 
to account for intra-cluster serial correlation on the errors, a potentially serious problem.
Pooled Regressions
I first study the concavity o f the earnings and return functions for the average analyst:
Earningsit =  a  +  a^Forecasta 4- OLiForSqa +  (3.19)
Returriit =  /? +  ^QForecastu +  PiForSqu  +  +  uu (3.20)
, where ForSq  accounts for Forecast Squared.
Because the return function is essentially an event study, it is important to ensure 
that I am capturing the reaction o f investors to an individual forecast rather than to other
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contemporaneous firm-specific events that may affect their valuation o f the firm. I add the 
one-day lagged abnormal return, LReturn, to the regression to control for this possibility. 
The public forecasts o f securities analysts cannot react as quickly as the market to a firm- 
specific event, since analysts have to communicate their forecasts to their private clients 
at least some hours before releasing them publicly to the I/B/E/S system. As a result, 
introducing the lagged return should control for the effects o f any event that influences 
the share price and also induces a revision o f the firm’s earnings forecast (in unreported 
regressions I ensure that adding up to five lags does not affect the empirical results). I also 
include year and quarter dummies.
I estimate (3.19) and (3.20) by Least Squares and Analyst Fixed Effects. The t  statis­
tics are constructed using cluster-adjusted standard errors, with all forecasts for the same 
firm-quarter grouped in one cluster. Cluster-adjusted standard errors guarantee consistency 
against arbitrary intra-cluster error correlation as well as arbitrary forms o f heteroskedas­
ticity across the whole sample. In the sample cluster-adjusted firm-quarter standard errors 
are much larger than GLS or OLS standard errors, and very similar to errors obtained by 
grouping forecasts by firm or by analyst. Thus I regard them as conservative estimates.
I also report the results o f median regressions. Because very often financial data have 
very fat tails, it is important to ensure that the results are robust to outlying observations. 
Median regressions are more robust to outliers because they minimise the sum o f absolute 
deviations, rather than the sum of squared deviations.
The results of the pooled parametric regressions are displayed in Table 2. The coef­
ficients on Forecast and ForSq  are positive and negative, respectively, across all regres­
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sions, confirming the existence of a concave relationship between the test variables. The 
t  statistics are all significant at the 1% level. Note that the introduction o f fixed effects 
does not alter significantly the magnitude o f the coefficients. The median regression of the 
return function, however, produces estimates that are much lower in value than the least 
squares estimation (0.19 versus 0.58). Although the coefficients are still significant, this 
seems to support the hypothesis that observations at the tails o f the distribution may have a 
disproportionate effect on the empirical results.
Regressions by different values of P rior
In this subsection I interact Forecast and F orSq  with the prior belief that the analyst 
is biased. I also allow for different intercepts by including both the variable P rior  and its 
square, PrSq.
In the return function I introduce further controls to ensure that I am isolating the re­
action o f the market to individual forecasts. Because analysts sometimes release forecasts 
for the same firm on the same day, I control for the average forecast o f the other analysts 
who made an announcement on the same day in which an analyst i announces his fore­
cast. Including the control variable AvForecast will help to isolate the reaction to the 
message of a particular analyst. I control also for the average forecast squared, AvForSq, 
and the number o f forecasts that compose such average, N um F or. Lastly, I include the 
interactions of A vF orecast and AvForSq  with N um F or. The final specifications are as
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follows:
EarningSit =  7  +  ^^Forecasta +  ')^ForSqit +  72PrzoTit +  ^^PrSqu
+^^Forecastit * P rior  a +  ^^ForSqa * P rio r  a 4- Cit (3.21)
Returriit =  +  SoForecastu +  SiForSqu +  Ô2Priorit +  S^PrSqu (3.22)
j
+ 0 4 Porecastit * Prior^  +  S^ForSqu * P riora  +  ^  SjXju +
j=i
, where X  refers to the control variables discussed above.
My aim with this parametric specification is to test whetherQpl^ZstdKiar =  ? 4  +  
2'y^Forecastit <  0 and Qf^-^stap^  =  <^ 4 +  25^Forecastit <  0. The results are dis­
played in Table 3. The coefficients of the interaction between Forecast and P rior  are all 
statistically significant.
By operating with the coefficients 7 4 , 7 5 , 1 find that the predictions o f the model are 
largely met for the earnings function. From the output o f the L S  estimation, for instance,
I have that 7 4  =  —0.23 and 7 5  =  —39. I conclude from these values that the marginal
effect o f P rior  on the slope of the earnings function is negative unless the forecast is very 
pessimistic*'*. Similar conclusions are obtained for the F E  and M edian  specifications 
of the earnings function. These conclusions corroborate the findings, that the slope of the 
earnings function is slower for analysts with higher P rior  unless they announce pessimistic 
forecasts.
—0.23 — 2 * 39 * Forecast =  0 at the value of Forecast =  —0.003, which is located approximately at the 
15th percentile of the distribution of Forecast.. For values o f Forecast above —0.003 the cross-derivative 
has a negative sign.
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I reach similar (if quantitatively stronger) conclusions by operating the coefficients 
of the return function. The coefficients Ô4 =  —0.16 and ^5 =  5.95 in the L S  estimation, 
for example, indicate that the slope o f the return function is lower for analysts with higher 
values o f P rior  unless they announce extremely bad news (i.e. in the first five percentiles 
of the Forecast distribution).
3.8 Why are Analysts Biased?
As was mentioned in the Introduction, regulators have implemented reforms in the last 
years to tackle the bias in analysts’ advice to investors. Choosing the right policy instrument 
to address such bias is clearly a complex issue that goes beyond the scope o f this chapter. 
Making the right choice, however, requires some understanding o f the reasons why analysts 
are biased. In this section I use the empirical strategy developed above to discriminate 
between two alternative hypotheses'^ that have inspired recent alternative policies.
In the belief that investment banking conflicts of interests are significant in the in­
dustry, America’s securities regulators imposed in April 2003 reforms to strengthen the 
internal separation between the investment banking and the research divisions of big bro­
kerage houses. There is substantial evidence that this belief is well-founded. Very often, 
for instance, an analyst in the research division of a big house can find that the invest­
ment bank division is counselling the very same company that he is forecasting on. Such 
counselling is habitually related to corporate finance activities, like initial public offering
Common to both hypotheses about analysts’ misaligned incentives is the belief that managers of the 
companies studied want them to be optimistic. Lim [31], for instance, states that ’’managers prefer favourable 
forecasts because these support higher capital valuations and, hence, their compensation levels”.
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(’’IPOs”), seasoned equity offering (”SEOs”), mergers or acquisitions. In fact, analysts at 
big houses are frequently involved in these activities, consulting on possible deals, join­
ing road shows and starting coverage of prospective or current corporate clients. Since big 
houses make most of their profits from corporate financing, analysts compensations can 
be strongly determined by their contribution to their employer seizing a bigger share of 
this profitable business (for evidence on this, see Unger [43], quoted in Boni and Womack 
[10]). It is often stated in the financial media that this has a strong impact on the priorities 
of analysts working for firms with investment banking divisions
Some authors have suggested, on the other hand, that analysts cooperate with the 
company’s management in order to maintain and improve their access to it. Lim [31] 
has argued, for instance, that analysts can only have steady and timely access to relevant 
information through their contacts with company managers. More interestingly. Boni and 
Womack [10] have emphasised that one o f the services that investors value most from 
analysts is their ability to arrange meetings for them with company executives. Both authors 
have argued that these may be the reasons why analysts seek to avoid painting a bleak 
picture o f the company’s future^ .^ Regulation Fair Disclosure, introduced by the SEC in 
late 2 0 0 1 , to eliminate selective disclosure of material information, has been inspired by 
these arguments.
For instance, Boni and Womack [10] offer survey-based evidence that buy-side professionals believe that 
the desire to attract investment banking business for their firm motivates analysts far more than any possible 
concern for the accuracy of their predictions. Anecdotal evidence is strongly consistent with this belief. As 
an example, one Goldman Sachs analyst was quoted as listing in an internal email his three most important 
goals for 2000 as ”1) Get more investment banking revenue 2) Get more investment banking revenue 3) Get 
more investment banking revenue” (The Economist [42])
Boni and Womack [10] report that 69.3% of institutional investors believe direct pressure from corporate 
management has a continuing effect on analysts research.
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It is important to understand the different implications o f the ’’investment banking” 
reason and the ’’management access” reason. Consider first the size o f the brokerage house 
that employs the analyst. If the investment banking reason is true, analysts in bigger bro­
kerage houses will be more biased than those in smaller brokerage houses. This is because 
only the biggest brokerage houses have an investment bank division, and can therefore ex­
pose their analysts to such conflicts of interest.
Under the ’’management access” reason analysts are eager to preserve managers’ 
cooperation. There is evidence, however, that managers of a company also benefit from 
receiving analysts’ coverage and want to encourage it. The reason is that firms covered 
by securities analysts are better known to investors and in general boost their share price^*. 
Therefore the relationship between analysts and management can be regarded as one where 
the parties need each other and are eager to obtain concessions from each other. Lim [31] 
has suggested that concessions by analysts could include biasing the earnings’ forecast.
I posit that under the ’’management access” reason the relative ’’bargaining power” 
of the two parties influences the extent to which analyst incentives are misaligned. For 
example, analysts from big brokerage houses hold a strong position, as the high visibility 
that they provide is strongly coveted by management. Similarly older analysts and analysts 
that follow more companies hold a stronger position and are therefore less biased. On the 
other hand, when a company is more important and more widely covered, I expect their
Krigman, Shaw and Womack [30] conducted a survey among 578 firms that went public between 1993 
and 1995 and conducted a SEO within three years of their IPO. They asked decision-makers at companies 
that had switched lead underwriters the main reasons for that decision. The main reason was revealed to be 
to "buy additional and influential analyst coverage fi"om the new lead underwriter”.
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managers to enjoy more ’’bargaining power”, and the forecasts made on those firms to be 
more biased.
I first provide preliminary evidence in support o f the ’’management access” reason 
by identifying the determinants o f P rior. I regress P rior  on the size o f the brokerage 
house, the number o f companies that an analyst follows, the analyst’s general experience, 
the company’s size in terms of book value and market capitalisation, and the coverage that 
the company is receiving from analysts. Since neither P rio r  nor the exogenous variables 
vary within an analyst-firm-quarter cell, I use only one observation per cell and drop the 
rest. The results are displayed in Table 4.
I first find that P rior  is positively correlated with analyst coverage, book value and 
market capitalisation and negatively correlated with size o f the brokerage size, the number 
o f companies that the analyst follows and the analyst general experience. This is consistent 
with the ’’management access” reason. I interpret the preliminary finding that analysts from 
bigger brokerage houses are less biased than those from smaller houses as evidence against 
the ’’investment banking” reason.
The results in Table 4 seem to indicate that the bias o f an analyst is correlated to 
certain variables related to his ’’bargaining power”. Using the empirical strategy developed 
in Section 3.7, however, I can provide a better test o f the ’’management access” hypothesis. 
If this hypothesis and the theoretical model of Section 3.3 are correct, an analyst working 
for a small brokerage house is very likely to have misaligned incentives. As a result, such 
analyst will predict above actual earnings if he makes an optimistic forecast, although not
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as much if  his forecast is pessimistic. Correspondingly, the market will react to pessimistic 
but not to optimistic forecasts.
I repeat regressions (3.21) and (3.22), and substitute P rio r  by each o f the vari­
ables that were correlated with it in Table 4. If the hypotheses are true, I expect to find 
>  0  and a r Z t S x  >  0  for the variables o f brokerage size, number o f  
companies that the analyst follows and his general experience and ^  ^
d?c^e^Iwx ^   ^ the variables of coverage of the firm, and size o f the firm (book value 
and market capitalisation). The results are displayed in Table 5.
Note first that the findings for the earnings function are largely consistent with the 
’’management access” hypothesis. For instance, expected earnings are higher following an 
optimistic forecast if the analyst making it works in a big brokerage house and follows 
sparsely covered and small (in terms o f book value) firms. The coefficients on number o f  
companies that the analyst follows and market capitalisation also have the predicted sign 
but are not significant. In the case of market capitalisation this is probably due to the strong 
collinearity with the coverage of the firm and its book value (the correlations o f market 
capitalisation with them is 6 8 % and 60% respectively). The coefficient on experience has, 
however, the wrong sign.
The findings for the return function do not support the hypothesis. Only two coeffi­
cients are significant, and the one on book value displays the wrong sign.
I confirm these results regarding the earnings function by running nonparametric re­
gressions separately for sub-samples o f high and low levels o f the test variables. The results 
are plotted in Figures 0-T. From Figure O it can be seen that analysts from bigger houses
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are less biased when they announce good news than analysts from smaller houses. Simi­
larly, analysts following widely covered (Figure R) or bigger firms (Figures S and T) are 
less biased when they announce good news, but not as much when they announce bad news. 
Figures P and Q do not seem to suggest that the variables capturing the number o f firms 
followed by the analyst and his experience significantly affect the shape o f the earnings 
function.
3.9 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter I have found evidence o f  a strategic interaction taking place in the stock 
market between investors and biased securities analysts. By using a simple model o f cheap 
talk, I have obtained two intuitive predictions about the optimal reaction o f investors to 
forecasts. I have then shown that the behaviour o f investors and analysts in the real world 
is consistent with these predictions. At am academic level, these findings demonstrate the 
need to use a game-theoretical approach to study the effect o f  forecasts in the financial 
markets.
My findings also have more practical implications. In the last years, regulators in the 
US have introduced a number of reforms iin the securities industry aimed at curbing the mis­
alignment o f incentives between analysts and investors. This chapter shows that investors 
as a whole are able to anticipate the misalignment of incentives and discount earnings fore­
casts accordingly. Investors are also ablle to discriminate across analysts, assigning less 
credibility to analysts with highly biased irecords. Contrary to what is sometimes believed, 
the average investor does not react naivel^y to public announcements by analysts.
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I have also shown, however, that lack of naivety on the investor’s side does not im­
ply that there is no scope for public intervention. This is easily understood by observing 
the flat right tail in the action function o f Figures C and L. Even if investors attempt to dis­
count the bias, the misalignment o f incentives is detrimental to the efficient transmission of 
information. The reason is that it prevents analysts from credibly transmitting good news 
about the firm’s earnings, and therefore obstructs the efficient transmission o f information 
in the market.
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3.10 Appendix
3.10.1 Figures A-D: Equilibrium
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3.10.2 Figures E-H: Other Equilibria, Cognitive Biases and Naive 
Investors
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3.10.3 Figures K-N: Nonparametric Regressions of Earnings and 
Returns
Nonparametric Regressions of Earnings and Returns
Figures K and L show nonparametric regressions o f Earnings and Return on Forecast. The scale in the horizontal axis shows the percentiles o f the Forecast 
variable. Forecast is the analyst forecast minus the prevailing consensus (consensus is the average forecast o f the previous day in which a forecast was 
made on the same firm/quarter earnings). Earnings is the actual value o f these earnings minus the consensus. Return is the abnormal return on the firm’s 
share price on the day in which the forecast was made. Figures M and N show nonparametric regressions o f Earnings and Return on Forecast for analysts 
with different prior probability o f being biased. For each analyst I compute the variable Prior (defined in Section 3.6), and split the sample in five quintiles 
according to this variable, q l (the thinner line) refers to the quintile o f analysts with the lowest value o f Prior. I run the regressions separately for each 
quintile. I use a normal kernel, optimal bandwidth ( 1 6*Standard Deviation o f Forecast*Number o f Observations) and 50 grid points. The confidence 
intervals are calculated with bootstrapping techniques (samples with replacement and SCO replications). The scale in the horizontal axis shows the
percentiles o f the Forecast variable.
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3.10.4 Figures O-T: The Importance of Relative Bargaining Power 
The Importance of Relative Bargaining Power
Figures O-T show the Earnings and Return regressions for different analyst and Arm characteristics. The Arm characteristics are deAned in Table 4. I use 
the same kernel, optimal bandwidths. grid points and bootstrapping techniques as in Figures K-N.
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3.10.5 Table 1: Summary Statistics
Table 1 
Summary Statistics
This table reports the summary statistics. Forecast is the analyst forecast minus the prevailing consensus (consensus is the average forecast o f  the previous 
day in which a forecast was made on the same firm/quarter earnings). Earnings is the actual value o f  these earnings minus the consensus. Return is the 
abnormal return on the firm’s share price on the day in which the forecast was made. Forecasts per firm/quarter is the number o f  forecasts that were made 
on the earnings o f  each firm/quarter combination. Similarly for Forecasts per firm/quarter/analyst. Analysts per firm/quarter is the number o f  analysts diat 
issued at least one forecast on the earnings o f  each firm/quarter combination. Firms per analyst/quarter is the number o f  firms for which an analyst issued 
at least one forecast in a quarter. Forecast horizon is the number o f days between the forecast armouncement and die armouncement o f  actual earnings.
Mean S.D. Median p25 p75
Forecast -0.00039 0.00339 -0.00006 -0.00107 0.00064
Earnings -0.00130 0.00688 -0.00002 -0.00190 0.00099
Forecast-Eamings 0.00090 0.00636 0 -0.00090 0.00113
Return -0.00089 0.03635 -0.00067 -0.01639 0.01555
Forecasts per day 1.35 1.15 1 1 1
Forecasts per firm/quarter 9.78 11.14 6 3 12
Analysts covering a firm/quarter 6.07 5.44 4 2 8
Firms covered by analyst/quarter 7.38 8.70 6 3 10
Forecast horizon (days) 85.49 45.13 86 47 117
Forecasts per analyst/firm/quarter 2.12 1.22 2 1 3
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3.10.6 Table 2: Pooled Earnings and Return Regressions
Table 2
Pooled Earnings and Return Regressions
This table reports the regressions o f  Earnings and Returns on Forecasts. These three variables are defined as in Table 1. All analyst-firm pairs are pooled 
together. ForSq is the Forecast Squared. LRetum is the one-day lagged Return variable. Y&Q accounts for year and quarter dummies. LS accounts for 
standard least squares. FE regressions include analyst-firm dummies. Median accounts for median (quantile) regressions. The Standard Errors (in 
parentheses) are robust and adjusted for firms-quarters correlation for the LS and FE regressions. The number o f  observations is 1,178,792. *** denotes
significant at the 1% level.
LS
Earnings
FE Median LS
Return
FE Median
Forecast 0.65*** 0.66*** 0.76*** 0.59*** 0.58*** 0.19***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.0005) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
ForSq -28.2*** -14.6*** -19.4*** -16.0*** -7.31*** -9.47***
(0.88) (0.66) (0.049) (2.13) (2.22) (1.41)
LRetum 0.01*** 0.007*** 0.003***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.0009)
Y&Q Ef. Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Adj.R^ 16% 37% 13% 0.5% 11% 0.05%
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3.10.7 Table 3: Regressions with Prior
Table 3
Regressions including the eSect o f the Prior probability that the analyst is biased
This table reports the regressions o f  Earnings and Returns on Forecasts and Prior (the prior probability that the analyst is biased). Table 1 has the 
definitions o f  the first three variables, ForSq and Y&Q E f. Prior is computed as the (weighted) percentage o f  times that the analyst has forecasted above 
the actual value in the past. The weights (defined in Section 3.6) are higher for more recent forecasts. PrSq is the variable Prior squared. Controls include 
LR etum , the average forecast by other analysts on the same day and firm/quarter on which die analyst issued his forecast, the average forecast squared, the 
number o f  forecasts that compose this average, and die interactions o f the average forecasts and its square with the number o f  forecasts the compose the 
average. LS, FE and Median regressions are defined as in Table 2. The Standard Errors (in parentheses) are robust and adjusted for firms-quarters 
correlation for the LS and FE regressions. ***,** and * denote significant at the 1%, S% and 10% level. Regressions include a constant The number o f
observations is 965,527.
LS
Earnings
FE Median LS
Return
FE Median
Forecast 0.69*** 0.69*** 0.84*** 0.34*** 0.35*** 0.16***
(0.009) (0.007) (0.001) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
ForSq -19.1*** -11.7*** -5.96*** -11.7*** 3.06 -3.83
(1.32) (1.03) (0.11) (3.27) (3.26) (2.43)
Prior -0.01*** -0.008*** -0.002*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.006***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.00002) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0006)
PrSq 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.001*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.005***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.00003) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007)
Prior*For. -0.23*** -0.18*** -0.35*** -0.16** -0.26*** -0.23***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.003) (0.08) (0.08) (0.075)
Prior*ForSq -39.0*** -12.0*** -63.7*** 5.95 -19.9** -12.8*
(3.13) (2.63) (0.32) (7.99) (8.25) (7.06)
Y&Q Ef. Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Adj.R^ 18% 40% 14% 0.9% 12% 0.2%
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3.10.8 Table 4: The Determinants of Prior
Table 4
The Determinants o f the Prior Probability that the Analyst is Biased
This table reports the regressions o f  the prior probability that the analyst (analyst-firm pair) is a biased type on a number o f  analyst and fiirm characteristics.
Prior is defined as in Table 3. Broker Size is the number o f  analysts that are employed in a  brokerage house in a year. Coman is the number o f  firms on 
which the analyst issues at least one forecast in a year. Ancom is the number o f  analysts that issue a forecast on the firm in a year. GenEx is the number o f 
quarters in which the analyst has issued at least one forecast. Marcap is the end-of-year market capitalisation o f  the firm. Book is the end-of-year book 
value o f  the firm. For each year and variable I split the sample in ten deciles and, to avoid endogeneity problems, I assign every analyst-firm pair the decile 
o f  the previous year. The results are unchanged i f  I include the variables in absolute levels and/or in their current year values. * * * denotes significant at the 
1% level. The standard errors (in parentheses) are heteroskedasticity robust The number o f  observations is 477,434.
Prior
Coefficient S.E.
Broker Size -0.003*** (0.0005)
ComAn -0.003*** (0.003)
GenExp -0.014*** (0.002)
AnCom 0.003*** (0.0004)
MarCap 0.004*** (0.0005)
Book 0.009*** (0.0003)
Year & Quarter Effects Yes
Fixed Effects Yes
Adj. r 2 60%
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3.10.9 Table 5: The importance of relative bargaining power
Table 5
The importance of relative bargaining power
This table reports the effect on the Earnings and Return regression o f  interacting Forecast and ForSq (defined in Table 2) with a number o f  firm and analyst 
characteristics (defined in Table 4). The controls are defined in Table 3. S.E. (in parentheses) are robust and adjusted for firms-quarters correlation. The 
Standard Errors (in parentheses) are robust and adjusted for firms-quarters correlation for the LS and FE regressions. ***,** and * denote significant at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level. Regressions include a constant The number o f  observations is 1,047,479.
Earnings
Coefficient S.E.
Return
Coefficient S.E.
Broker Size*For 0.02*** (0.003) 0.03*** (0.009)
Broker Size*ForSq 2.12*** (0.40) 1.33 (0.95)
Coman*For 0.0008 (0.002) -0.003 (0.008)
Coman*ForSq 0.50 (0.32) 0.57 (0.82)
GenExp* For -0.005 (0.008) 0.03 (0.02)
GenExp*ForSq -4.28*** (0.93) -0.83 (2.30)
Ancom*For -0.026*** (0.003) -0.01 (0.01)
Ancom*ForSq -1.27*** (0.41) -1.35 (1.08)
Marcap*For -0.005 (0.004) 0.009 (0.015)
Marcap* ForSq -0.58 (0.51) 1.16 (1.43)
Book*For 0.001 (0.004) 0.009 (0.01)
Book*ForSq -0.94** (0.42) 2.35** (1.15)
Controls No Yes
Year & Quarter Effects Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes
R2 17% 1%
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3.10.1 (Proofs
I use the following notation throughout the Appendix. First o f all, p =  g / ( l  — g). Further, 
remember that F(m , a:) =  0 is the implicit function o f m on a; defined by (3.10). Define 
F[m^x)  as a function with two exogenous variables, m  and x. Define F(m,a:o) as a 
function with one exogenous variable m,  where xq is a parameter o f the function. Lastly, 
define F  {mo, Xq) as a specific value, given by the function F(m,  x) when it is evaluated at 
the values mo and Xq.
Proof of Lemma 4 When the investor observes a message m', his optimal action solves:
Ma x  — J  {a — x Ÿ  j3{x\  m!) dx 
M a x {—c? +  2 a J  x ^ {x  \ m') dx — J  x"^  ^{x | m') dx}
The optimal action is therefore a =  E[x  | m'].
Proof of Proposition 6  It follows from the discussion in the main text that a fully- 
responsive equilibrium requires o(m) to be increasing. I first rule out fully-responsive 
equilibria where the message is issues using mixed strategies. Assume that mi and m 2, 
with m i ^  m2 , are both sent in equilibrium when x =  Xi. If the analyst is indifferent 
between both m i and m2 , it must be that a (mi) =  a(m 2 ). But in this case the action 
function is not strictly increasing and the equilibrium is not fully responsive.
Assume now that the message is issued using a pure strategy. The equilibrium mes­
sage function, m  =  fi{x), must solve (3.10) and be defined for all x. But I show now that 
there exists a value o f x, xq, such that F{m,  xq) <  0 Vm. Take xq =  If m  <  xq, the
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inequality is immediate. If m >  a;o, then >  Xq. The exponential function has the prop­
erty that exp(z) > 1  +  2:. Therefore F(m , Xq) <  m  — xq — b — bp{l  +  (m^ — XQ)/2a^) =  
m  — ^ —h —bp — But this last expression reaches a maximum at mo =  at
which it is equal to — 6(1 +  p) < 0 .  So (3.10) is not defined at the point xq =
Before proving Proposition 7, I use the following Lemma to derive some technical 
properties about (3.10).
Lemma 5 Consider F{m,  x) =  0. For any set o f  parameter values 6  >  0, g >  0 and 
^ 2  >  0 .-
1. There always exists a value o f  x, x q , such that this equation has at least one solution 
mo, and another value X\ such that this equation has no solution.
2. There exists only one value o f  x, x, for which this equation has a unique solution, m. 
For every value x < x  the equation has exactly two solutions, p}{x) and fF{x), with 
p^{x) <  in <  p^{x) Mx.
3. The function p} (x) satisfies the following properties:
(a)
(b) ^ > 0
Proof
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Part 1
The second statement derives directly from Proposition 6 . To prove the first state­
ment, distinguish two cases:
1. If p <  1, make xq =  —2b and note that the function F{m,  —2b) is a continuous
function Vm, that F(0, — 26q) >  0 and that F { —2bo,—2bo) < 0 .  It follows that there is 
a mo 6 ] — 2b, 0[ such that F{mo, —2b) =  0 and (3.10) has a solution.
2 . If p >  1, make x  =  —2bp, and note that the function F{m,  —2bp) is a continuous 
function Vm that F(0, —2bp) >  0 and that F { —2bp, —2bp) <  0. It follows that there is 
a mo g] — 2bp, 0[ such that F  (mo, —2bp) =  0 and (3.10) has a solution.
Part 2
I first show that if (3.10) has a solution for Xq, then it has exactly two solutions for 
every x <  xq. Call mo to the solution of (3.10) for x =  xq and make k =  mo—x o > 0 .  Take 
a value xi  <  xq and note that the fiinction F  (m, x\)  is continuous and twice differentiable 
Vm, and that F{x i , x i )  <  0 and F{xi  -f k, Xi) >  0. By L’Hopital rule, note that:
lim " ^ - ^ 1   \______ =  0
m->+cx3l  4-pexp((m^ — x\)/2a'^)) mpexp((m^ — x \)/2(t‘^ ))
It follows that there is a value m2 such that Vm >  m2 ,
m  — xi < b { l  -|-pexp((m^ — x \ ) / 2 a ‘^ ))). For those values o f m, F{ m, x i )  <  0. In 
particular, note that F  (m2 , Xi) <  0 and that m 2 >  xi  +  k. So I have found three values, 
xi <  xi  k <  m 2 such that F{x i , x i )  <  0 , F{xi  -f k, x i )  >  0  and F { m 2 , x i )  <  0 .
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Therefore there are two values m u and m i2 , such that Xi <  m u <  X i k  <  m i2 <  m2 
and F(rri i i ,xi) =  F ( m i 2 , X\) =  0. This shows that (3.10) has at least two solutions for 
every x < x q .
I now show that (3.10) has only two solutions for every x <  Xq. Assume that there 
is a third value, m i3 , such that F{rrii^,xi) =  0. In that case there are two values, m3 G 
(mii,mi3) and G (mi3,mi2) such that =  0, and another value,
ms G (m3 , m4 ) such that =  0. But it is easy to see that <  0 Vm, hence
a contradiction and (3.10) has exactly two solutions.
From Proposition 6  and Part 1 o f this Lemma, I have that the real set H  =  {x  : 
3m /F (m , x) =  0} (henceforth H ) is non-empty and bounded from above. I also know 
that if Xq belongs to H, then every x <  xq also belongs to it. It follows that H  has a 
supreme value, x, and it is of the form (—0 0 , x[ or (—0 0 , î] . I finish the proof o f Part 2 by 
showing that equation (3.10) has a unique solution for the supreme value x.
I first show that at least one solution exists. Since x  is the supreme of i f ,  I can 
build a strictly increasing sequence {a:n}^i such that lim Xn =  x, and for every Xn there
n —►oo
exist two values m^,! and rrin,2 , with m^,i <  m„,2 and (a;„,m„,i) and (a;„,mn,2 ) satisfy 
(3.10). Call m„ =  m„,i and note that the sequence {m ^ }^ ! is bounded. It is bounded 
from below, since Vn, m„ >  Xn >  x j, where x j is the first term of the sequence that 
converges to x. It is also bounded from above. To see that, make s =  max (|a;/|, |x|). Since 
J ig ? ^ i+P.exp((mtl,^)/2.^)) =  0- (here is a mo such that Vm >  mo, <
b. Therefore, Vm >  mo and any n I have that F{m,  Xn) <  F{m,  s) <  0 Vn and the 
sequence is bounded from above by the value mo.
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The sequence is bounded so I can build a subsequence {m„^}g,ithat con­
verges to a certain m. Therefore the sequence converges to ( î ,  m).
Consider the function of two variables F  (x, m), which is continuous at ( î ,  m).  Since 
lim {xn^,mn^) =  (x,rh), lim =  F{x, fh) .  Since F  J  =  0 , then
k —» 4 - o o  f c ^ + o o
F  {x, fh) =  0 and m =  m is a solution to (3.10).
Lastly I show that the solution m  is unique. Consider the function F{m,'x),  which is 
continuous and twice differentiable. Assume that there are two values fhi <  mg that satisfy 
F  {rhi,x) =  F  (mg, x) =  0. If that is the case, there will be a value m3 G]mi, mg[ such 
that =  0. Since <  0 , F(m , ^  has a relative maximum at m 3 , and since
F  (fhi,x)  =  F  (mg, x) =  0, then F  (m3, ^  >  0. Consider now the continuous function of 
X, F  (m3, x). From the argument above, F  (m3, x) >  0. On the other hand, F  (m3, m3) <  0 
and m3 >  X. Consequently there must be a xqq g ] î ,  m3[ such that F  (m3, Xqo) =  0. But if 
that is the case x is not the supreme o f H,  which is a contradiction.
Parts
Assume that xi <  x and F{mi^xi)  =  F (m g,x i) =  0. If mi <  mg, then note 
that^Li^Eil >  0  and <  0. The proof is as follows. It was shown in the previous
Part that <  0 Vm and that there is a point m 3 €  (m i, mg) such that =  0.
It follows immediately that >  0 and — <  0.
Note also that =  0. The proof is as follows. It was shown in the previ­
ous Part that I can take a strictly increasing sequence {iCn}^i that converges to x  and
two sequences { m „ i}^ i and {m „g}^ i that converge to m such that m„i <  m„g and
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{xn,mn\}  and 771 2^} are solutions to (3.10). Assume that >  0, and con­
sider the function F { x , m ) ,  which is continuous at ( î ,m ) . Since lim (xn,m„2) =
n—»+oo
{x,fh),  lim F{xn, mn 2 ) =  F{x , fh)  <  0, which is a contradiction. Similarly assum-
M —» + 0 0
ing <  0 leads to a contradiction, so necessarily =  0.
I proceed now to prove the different Subparts o f Part 3.
Part 3.a Differentiating (3.10):
V  l - ^ e x p ( K - x ^ ) / 2 a ^ )
dx  I _ ^ e x p ( ( m 2 - a ; 2 ) / 2 a 2 )
Since /i^(x) <  fi^{x), then >  0. Since m >  x, it also follows that >  0
Part S.b Differentiating (3.10) twice and rearranging:
S  -  -  »  4 < "  ( S ) - > ■ >
d m  ^ ^ /
The numerator and the denominator o f the fraction are positive numbers. The term 
in brackets is positive, since ^  >  1, which completes the proof.
Part S.c Differentiating (3.10) twice over x  and over p.
^ p 6 e x p ( = ^ ) ( l  -  ^  e x p ( z ^ ) )  +  m  -
All elements o f the fraction are positive, and therefore >  0. Furthermore p =  
q / ( l  -  9) SO has the same sign as ■
Proof of Proposition 7 Any equilibrium must satisfy (3.6) and (3.8). From the proof of 
Proposition 6 , a(m)  is increasing in an interval [mi, m2] only if  every message in this inter­
val is produced in pure strategies. So in every region where a(m)  is increasing (3.10) must
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hold. But Proposition 6  states that if x is very high, no message satisfies (3,10). Therefore 
=  0 in equilibrium if T is higher than certain value which, for the moment, I call 
X*. Assume that >  0 if a; <  z*. Call (oo,x*] and (x*,oo) the responsive and the
non-responsive parts of the equilibrium. Lemma 5, shows that (3,10) has exactly two solu­
tions, y}-{x) and with fj}'{x) <  i^ {^x). But j^? { x ) is bounded from below and cannot 
be part o f an equilibrium. So in the responsive part of the equilibrium the message strat­
egy must be /x^(x). So =  fj}{x), and Parts 2,a, 2,b and 2,c o f Proposition 7 follow
directly from Parts 3,a, 3,b, 3,c o f Lemma 5,
Call m* =  ii^^{x*) and note that the message space can be divided in a responsive 
part, (oo, m*] and a non-responsive part, (m*, oo). This proves Part 1,
In the responsive section E[x | m] — x — 6  =  0, so the biased analyst is reaching his 
bliss point. Therefore a =   ^ (m) +  h and Parts 3,a, 3,b, and 3,c o f this proposition
follow from Parts 2,a, 2,b and 2,c,
Consider now the non-responsive part. Call a* the value o f the "flat" action when 
m  >  m*. But m  >  m* can be issued only if the analyst is honest and x >  m* or the 
analyst is biased and x >  x*. a* therefore averages over all the possible values o f x  in 
which the equilibrium message is above m*.
a* =  P  [Honest | m  >  m*]  ^E [x  \ m >  m*, Honest]
+  P  [Biased | m >  m*] * E [x  | m >  m*, Biased]
_  / ”. <t> (x) dx * J ”  x<!) (x) dx +  / ”  4>{x)dx* J ”  x<!> (x) dx
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Rearranging (3.23) it is easy to find (3.11). That proves Part 4. Part 5 comes directly 
from (3.6).
Note that a(m) is continuous in the responsive part o f the equilibrium, as shown in 
Part 3. The non-responsive part is flat, and therefore continuous. So the equilibrium is 
continuous if the action does not ’’jump” at the point x*. (3.11) capture this condition and 
determines with (3.10) the point (x*, m*).
Lastly I comment on the other continuous equilibria o f the model o f Section 3.3, and 
show that they are less responsive than the one described in Proposition 7.
It is immediate to see that there can be an equilibrium where a =  E[x]  = 0  and m  
solves (1 — g) m(f) (m) 4- q /  xv  {m \ x) (j) {x) dx =  0 Vm. Because in this equilibrium the 
action does not vary with the message, it is clearly less responsive that the one identified in 
Proposition 7.
Note next that an equilibrium where the action function is increasing in two intervals 
[mi, m 2] and [m3 , m4] but fiat in the interval [m2 , m 3], where m% <  m 2 <  m 3 <  m^, does 
not exist. The reason is the following. If the action function is flat between m 2 and m 3 , then 
0 (7712) =  u(m 3 ). If the action function is increasing in the intervals [mi, m 2] and [m3 , m4], 
then from (3.8) it must be that the biased analyst is reaching his bliss point both when he 
announces m 2 and when he announces m 3 . This is only possible if either a (m2) <  a (m3) 
which is an obvious contradiction, or m 2 and m3 are both sent when the biased analyst 
observes the same x. But from Lemma 5 that the implicit function o f m on a: determined 
by F(m , x) =  0  is uniquely determined, which creates a contradiction.
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The only possibility left is now for an equilibrium with an increasing section in the 
middle o f the message space and two flat sections on the lower and upper extremes. Lastly, 
note that an equilibrium is possible where:
1. The action function is strictly increasing in the interval [m**, m*] and it is characterised 
by Part 3 o f Proposition 7.
2. The action is flat to the right of m* with a* determined by (3.11) and (3.12) holding 
for any m >  m*.
3. The action is flat to the left o f m**, with a** characterised by:
^  #  (%**) +  (1 -  q)(l> (m**)
Ç0  (x**) +  (1  — q)^  (m**)
and the condition below holding for any m  <  m**\
(1  -  q) m(f) (m) +  q xv  (m | rr) 0  (x) dx _
{ l - q )<f ) {m) - \ -q  v { m \ x ) ( l )  (x) dx
4. An analyst that observes x** is indifferent between the responsive and the
non-responsive part o f the equilibrium:
_  q(f){x**)x** +  (1 -  q)(j){7n**)m** 
q(j){x**) +  (1 -  q)(f){m**)
and, similarly, (3.13) holds for x*.
Figure F shows the shape o f this equilibrium. It is immediate to realise that it is identi­
cal to the most responsive equilibrium except for an extra flat part to the left o f the message 
m**. The conclusion that this is a less responsive equilibrium is therefore obvious. ■
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